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LAND LAW FEDERALISM
Ashira Pelman Ostrow*
ABSTRACT
Land exhibits a unique duality. Each parcel is at once absolutely fixed in
location and inextricably linked to a complex array of interconnected systems,
natural and man-made. Ecosystems spanning vast geographic areas sustain
human life; interstate highways, railways, and airports physically connect
remote areas; networks of buildings, homes, offices, and factories create
communities and provide the physical context in which most human interaction
takes place. Despite this duality, the dominant descriptive and normative
account of land-use law is premised upon local control. In a world where
capital and information pass freely across increasingly porous jurisdictional
boundaries, few regulatory matters can be cabined within the borders of a
single state, let alone a single locality. Thus, despite the mantra of localism,
modern land-use law has evolved to incorporate a significant, though
undertheorized, national dimension.
This Article develops a coherent national account of land-use law. First,
this Article establishes a doctrinal basis and normative justification for federal
land-use law, both of which derive from the cumulative effects of local landuse decisions on interstate commerce and the national welfare. Second, this
Article develops a theoretical framework through which to analyze the
substantial body of existing federal land law. Finally, the Article applies
principles of federalism theory to outline a “local-official-as-federal-agent”
model of land-use law that harnesses the relative regulatory capacities of each
level of government.
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INTRODUCTION
It is hardly unique to describe land as unique.1 In one sense, land is unique
because it is immobile; it is, by definition, local.2 Its value is specific to its
owner and locational context—its geography, topography, current use, and
relationship to surrounding uses and users. Yet the uniqueness of land derives
not only from its “localness” but also from its “nationalness”—from the role
that it plays in national networks. Each parcel is at once absolutely fixed in
location and inextricably linked to a complex array of interconnected systems,
natural and man-made. Ecosystems spanning vast geographic areas sustain
human life; interstate highways, railways, and airports physically connect
remote areas; telecommunications towers dotting the landscape facilitate
increasingly sophisticated forms of communication; energy infrastructure
crosses state and local boundaries to power the nation; and networks of
buildings, homes, offices, and factories create communities and provide the
physical context in which most human interaction takes place.3
Despite the expansion of the federal government over the past century,
local governments have retained primary authority to regulate the use of land.4
1 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 360 cmt. e (1981) (“A specific tract of land has
long been regarded as unique and impossible of duplication by the use of any amount of money.”).
2 Ashira Pelman Ostrow, Process Preemption in Federal Siting Regimes, 48 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 289,
297 (2011).
3 See JOHN R. LOGAN & HARVEY L. MOLOTCH, URBAN FORTUNES: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PLACE
17 (1987) (“[P]lace is indispensable; all human activity must occur somewhere.”); Robert C. Ellickson,
Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315, 1317 (1993) (“Because human beings are fated to live mostly on the
surface of the earth, the pattern of entitlements to use land is a central issue in social organization.”); Eduardo
M. Peñalver, Land Virtues, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 821, 829 (2009) (describing land “as an essential component
in any human activity that requires physical space”).
4 See, e.g., Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I—The Structure of Local Government Law, 90
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 3 (1990) (“Land use control is the most important local regulatory power.”); Sara C.
Bronin, The Quiet Revolution Revived: Sustainable Design, Land Use Regulation, and the States, 93 MINN. L.
REV. 231, 236 (2008) (“[T]he prevailing descriptive and normative view of land use involves, first and
foremost, local control.”); Jerold S. Kayden, National Land-Use Planning in America: Something Whose Time
Has Never Come, 3 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 445, 449–50 (2000) (finding that local land-use laws continue to
enjoy “a near absolute status as untouchable local government prerogatives”); John R. Nolon, In Praise of
Parochialism: The Advent of Local Environmental Law, 26 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 365, 366 (2002) (noting a
“national understanding that the power to control the private use of land is a state prerogative, one that has
been delegated, in most states, to local governments”); Carol M. Rose, Planning and Dealing: Piecemeal Land
Controls as a Problem of Local Legitimacy, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 837, 839 (1983) (“Land use control in America
has always been an intensely local area of the law.”); Daniel P. Selmi, The Contract Transformation in Land
Use Regulation, 63 STAN. L. REV. 591, 616 (2011) (“[L]ocal government has retained almost full authority
over land use . . . .”); A. Dan Tarlock, Land Use Regulation: The Weak Link in Environmental Protection, 82
WASH. L. REV. 651, 653 (2007) (“The United States has . . . enshrined the idea that land should be controlled
at the lowest level of government, if at all.”); Katherine A. Trisolini, All Hands on Deck: Local Governments
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Scholars and policy makers often reject the notion of an expanded federal
role,5 even as they recognize that local zoning boards lack the capacity and the
incentive to address complex problems,6 such as urban sprawl and affordable
housing that are created by the cumulative impact of local land-use decisions.7
In a world where capital and information flow freely across national and
subnational boundaries, few regulatory matters can be cabined within the
jurisdictional lines of a single state, let alone a single locality.8
In response, modern land-use law has evolved to incorporate a variety of
national concerns.9 Federal laws that directly regulate or seek to influence land

and the Potential for Bidirectional Climate Change Regulation, 62 STAN. L. REV. 669, 740 (2010) (“[Z]oning
and land use remain largely the province of local governments.”); William A. Fischel, The Evolution of
Zoning Since the 1980s: The Persistence of Localism § 3, at 4–5 (Sept. 2010) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1686009 (noting that the most remarkable aspect of local zoning is that it
has remained local).
5 See, e.g., Bronin, supra note 4, at 262 (“No serious scholar supports an expanded role for the national
government in traditional land use regulation . . . .”); Eric T. Freyfogle, The Particulars of Owning, 25
ECOLOGY L.Q. 574, 580 (1999) (noting that “[l]and use regulation at the state level is bad enough” and that
“[d]irect federal regulation, for many citizens, is simply taking things too far”); Kayden, supra note 4, at 451–
53 (suggesting that the size of the United States, its private-property tradition, and citizen preference for local
control cut against national involvement); Catherine J. LaCroix, Land Use and Climate Change: Is It Time for
a National Land Use Policy?, 35 ECOLOGY L. CURRENTS 124, 124 (2008), http://elq.typepad.com/currents/pdf/
currents35-16-lacroix-2008-1124.pdf (“It will never be time for an articulated federal land use policy; the
tradition of local control of land use is simply too strong.”); Daniel B. Rodriguez, The Role of Legal
Innovation in Ecosystem Management: Perspectives from American Local Government Law, 24 ECOLOGY
L.Q. 745, 751 (1997) (explaining why property owners and local governments resist centralization of land-use
regulatory authority); Trisolini, supra note 4, at 740 (arguing that efforts to centralize regulation of land
“would likely provoke fierce political opposition, as many consider this a core local function, central to local
governments’ ability to maintain autonomy”).
6 Janice C. Griffith, Regional Governance Reconsidered, 21 J.L. & POL. 505, 511 (2005); Alexandra B.
Klass & Elizabeth Wilson, Interstate Transmission Challenges for Renewable Energy: A Federalism
Mismatch, 65 VAND. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 42–47), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2012075 (articulating the desirability of federal regulation but noting that federal
intervention is politically unfeasible absent a national crisis); Uma Outka, The Renewable Energy Footprint,
30 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 241, 291 (2011) (noting the merits of federal regulation but concluding that reallocation
of authority in land-use law is politically unfeasible); Patricia E. Salkin, Smart Growth and Sustainable
Development: Threads of a National Land Use Policy, 36 VAL. U. L. REV. 381, 389 (2002) (declaring that
“[t]here is no doubt that a need exists for more comprehensive federal legislation on land use” but maintaining
that the authority will and should remain local).
7 See sources cited infra note 36.
8 Robert A. Schapiro, Federalism as Intersystemic Governance: Legitimacy in a Post-Westphalian
World, 57 EMORY L.J. 115, 120 (2007) (“In contemporary society, the dichotomy of ‘truly local’ and ‘truly
national’ has no substance.”); see also Robert B. Ahdieh, From Federalism to Intersystemic Governance: The
Changing Nature of Modern Jurisdiction, 57 EMORY L.J. 1, 17 (2007); Griffith, supra note 6, at 510–11.
9 John R. Nolon, Champions of Change: Reinventing Democracy Through Land Law Reform, 30 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 45 (2006) (describing the evolution of land-use law to incorporate state and federal influences);
see also BRIAN W. BLAESSER & ALAN C. WEINSTEIN, FEDERAL LAND USE LAW & LITIGATION § 1:1, at 6
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use include federal permitting schemes under the Endangered Species Act10
(ESA) and the Clean Water Act11 (CWA), federal siting regimes under the
Telecommunications Act12 (TCA) and the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act13 (RLUIPA), and land-use planning requirements
imposed in connection with federal housing and transportation funding. In
addition, many other federal laws impact land use incidentally, as a byproduct
of their main goals, including, for example, land-use decisions that must be
made to achieve federally mandated emissions standards under the Clean Air
Act and the CWA’s Stormwater Phase II Rule.14
Thus, despite the mantra of localism, a significant body of federal land-use
law, defined broadly to include federal policies that influence the development
of privately owned land, already exists. In the absence of a national land-use
policy, however, observers have typically studied each federal policy in
isolation, describing an uncoordinated federal statutory “patchwork,”15 enacted
“piecemeal”16 and resulting in inconsistent and sometimes self-defeating
regulatory policies.17 In contrast to other substantive areas of law,18 including,
for example, environmental law,19 the legal literature has yet to develop a
(2007); Shelby D. Green, The Search for a National Land Use Policy: For the Cities’ Sake, 26 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 69 (1998); ROBERT I. MCMURRY, A.L.I.–A.B.A. LAND USE INST., USING FEDERAL LAWS AND
REGULATIONS TO CONTROL LOCAL LAND USE 357 (2001).
10 Endangered Species Act of 1973 § 10(a), 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(1)(A)–(B) (2006).
11 Clean Water Act of 1972 § 404, 33 U.S.C. § 1344.
12 Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 704(a), 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(ii)–(iii).
13 Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 § 2(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(1).
14 40 C.F.R. § 122.21–.29 (2011); see also infra Part II.
15 Kayden, supra note 4, at 446.
16 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, B-280699, COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT: EXTENT OF FEDERAL
INFLUENCE ON “URBAN SPRAWL” IS UNCLEAR 9 (1999); Randolph R. Lowell, Coastal Smart Growth, 22 PACE
ENVTL. L. REV. 231, 237 (2005); Todd A. Wildermuth, National Land Use Planning in America, Briefly, 26 J.
LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 73, 73 (2005).
17 Green, supra note 9, at 119; see also Robert L. Glicksman, Climate Change Adaptation: A Collective
Action Perspective on Federalism Considerations, 40 ENVTL. L. 1159, 1173 (2010) (“Congress has almost
always steered clear of establishing anything that remotely resembles a federal land use regulatory
program . . . .”).
18 See, e.g., Michael Heise, The Political Economy of Education Federalism, 56 EMORY L.J. 125 (2006);
Renee M. Jones, Rethinking Corporate Federalism in the Era of Corporate Reform, 29 J. CORP. L. 625 (2004);
Clare Huntington, The Constitutional Dimension of Immigration Federalism, 61 VAND. L. REV. 787 (2008); Daniel
Richman, The Past, Present, and Future of Violent Crime Federalism, 34 CRIME & JUST. 377 (2006).
19 See, e.g., William W. Buzbee, Contextual Environmental Federalism, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 108
(2005); Ann E. Carlson, Iterative Federalism and Climate Change, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1097 (2009); John P.
Dwyer, The Practice of Federalism Under the Clean Air Act, 54 MD. L. REV. 1183 (1995); Kirsten H. Engel,
Harnessing the Benefits of Dynamic Federalism in Environmental Law, 56 EMORY L.J. 159 (2006); Daniel C.
Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 95 MICH. L. REV. 570 (1996). Other scholars have applied
federalism theory to biodiversity conservation. See Bradley C. Karkkainen, Biodiversity and Land, 83
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robust theory of federalism to tie together the disparate strands of federal landuse law.20
This Article considers the body of federal land-use law as a whole and
assesses its component parts through the lens of federalism. Part I introduces
the cumulative effects doctrine that underlies federal regulation of “trivial”
intrastate activity that would, in the aggregate, have a nontrivial effect on
interstate commerce.21 Part I then applies the cumulative effects doctrine to the
“Not in My Backyard”22 (NIMBY) phenomenon using two examples—the
affordable-housing crisis and the challenge of achieving energy security—to
illustrate the national implications of cumulative land-use decisions. Indeed,
both of these shortages have been attributed, at least in part, to restrictive
zoning policies that make it difficult to site crucial national facilities.23
Part II argues that, despite its “patchwork” or “piecemeal” appearance, the
body of federal land law is bound by a common objective—to counterbalance
the harm that would result from unfettered local control over land use. Federal
law can be used to subsidize development that would be suboptimally
permitted by local governments, including nationally significant but locally
undesirable land uses, such as cell phone towers, energy infrastructure, and
affordable housing. Federal law can also be used to preserve resources that
would otherwise be overexploited, as in the case of wetlands, endangered
species habitats, and coastal zones. Both types of laws can be implemented
directly by a federal administrative agency or indirectly using fiscal and

CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1997); J.B. Ruhl, Biodiversity Conservation and the Ever-Expanding Web of Federal
Laws Regulating Nonfederal Lands: Time for Something Completely Different?, 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 555
(1995); A. Dan Tarlock, Biodiversity Federalism, 54 MD. L. REV. 1315 (1995).
20 An exception is Patty Salkin, who has argued that federal policies promoting sustainable development
constitute a de facto national land-use policy. Salkin, supra note 6, at 382; see also Patricia E. Salkin, The
Quiet Revolution and Federalism: Into the Future, 45 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 253 (2012) (providing a
comprehensive summary of federal statutes that impact land use).
21 See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 127–28 (1942) (holding that Congress’s power under the
Commerce Clause extends to regulating wheat grown solely for home consumption because of the aggregate
impact on the national market); see also Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 16–17 (2005) (upholding the federal
regulation of homegrown medicinal marijuana based upon Wickard’s cumulative-impact rationale).
22 For an overview of NIMBY, see WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS: HOW HOME
VALUES INFLUENCE LOCAL GOVERNMENT TAXATION, SCHOOL FINANCE, AND LAND-USE POLICIES 9–11, 262
(2001); Michael Dear, Understanding and Overcoming the NIMBY Syndrome, 58 J. AM. PLAN. ASS’N 288
(1992); and Michael B. Gerrard, The Victims of NIMBY, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 495 (1994).
23 This Article uses the term “restrictive zoning” to include local zoning policies that have the effect of
excluding affordable housing as well as other locally undesirable uses. See infra notes 78–80 and accompanying
text.
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regulatory incentives to persuade local officials to participate in administering
the federal program.24
Such distinctions are admittedly simplistic. Many federal land laws have
multiple objectives and utilize a mix of preemptive and cooperative techniques.
Nonetheless, the basic taxonomy, (a) pro-development or anti-development
and (b) direct or indirect, provides a useful starting point for theorizing federal
land-use law.
Building upon the theoretical framework developed in Part II, Part III takes
up a basic question of federalism: How should authority be allocated between
the national government and its subnational units?25 In particular, this Part
assesses the relative regulatory capacities of each level of government—
federal, state, and local—to design and implement land-use policies that
account for the cumulative impact of land-use decisions on the nation as a
whole. The persistence of localism in land-use law presents a unique forum for
federalism. Traditional theories of federalism focus on the federal–state
relationship or on the state–local relationship.26 The relative absence of the
state in land-use law invites federalism theorists to explore the boundaries of a
federal–local relationship.27

24 See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 166–69 (1992); see also Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The
Political Economy of Cooperative Federalism: Why State Autonomy Makes Sense and “Dual Sovereignty”
Doesn’t, 96 MICH. L. REV. 813, 859–60, 866 (1998) (describing the use of conditional grants and conditional
preemption to induce state cooperation).
25 See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, ENHANCING GOVERNMENT: FEDERALISM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 10 (2008)
(“[U]ltimately the issue of federalism is about what allocation of power provides the best governance with the
least chances of abuse.”); Heather K. Gerken, The Supreme Court, 2009 Term—Foreword: Federalism All the
Way Down, 124 HARV. L. REV. 4, 22 (2010) (asserting that what makes federalism and localism distinctive is
that they provide “a broad-gauged, democratic account of how . . . nested governmental structures ought to
interact”); Robert A. Schapiro, Toward a Theory of Interactive Federalism, 91 IOWA L. REV. 243, 254 (2005)
(“Federalism involves the allocation of authority to a national government and to subnational units. A theory
of federalism should guide this allocation.”).
26 Nestor M. Davidson, Cooperative Localism: Federal–Local Collaboration in an Era of State
Sovereignty, 93 VA. L. REV. 959, 960 n.1 (2007); Daniel J. Elazar, Cooperative Federalism, in COMPETITION
AMONG STATES AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS: EFFICIENCY AND EQUITY IN AMERICAN FEDERALISM 65, 66
(Daphne A. Kenyon & John Kincaid eds., 1991); Gerken, supra note 25, at 25–26.
27 See, e.g., Davidson, supra note 26; Gerken, supra note 25; Hills, supra note 24; see also Erin Ryan,
Federalism and the Tug of War Within: Seeking Checks and Balance in the Interjurisdictional Gray Area, 66
MD. L. REV. 503, 573 (2007) (arguing for increased cooperation between the federal and state governments to
address “interjurisdictional” regulatory problems that arise due to an overlap between a federally regulated
interest and a local land-use policy).
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Part III accepts this invitation, outlining a hybrid federal–local regulatory
model that relies upon local officials to implement national land-use policies.28
This “local-official-as-federal-agent” model harnesses (a) the capacity of the
federal government, with its distance from local politics and economic
pressures, to coordinate land use on a national scale and (b) the capacity of
local officials, who have detailed knowledge of the land and are politically
accountable to the local community, to implement land-use policies at the local
level. Local implementation of a federal land-use policy is likely to produce
individual decisions that are consistent with national priorities but sensitive to
the local context.
I. LOCAL LAND AS A NATIONAL RESOURCE
In modern society, capital, information, and resources pass seamlessly
across increasingly porous jurisdictional boundaries. Land does not. Perhaps
because of its immobility, the dominant descriptive and normative account of
land-use law is premised upon local control. State-level zoning, once identified
as “the quiet revolution” in land-use law,29 failed to alter the fundamentally
local nature of land-use law.30 Periodic calls for an increased federal role in
land-use planning have similarly gone unanswered.31 The federal judiciary has

28 This conception is consistent with an emerging trend in environmental law scholarship pointing to the
utility of federal–local cooperation in addressing interjurisdictional problems, such as climate change and
environmental pollution. See, e.g., Katrina Fischer Kuh, Capturing Individual Harms, 35 HARV. ENVTL. L.
REV. 155 (2011) (arguing for federal–local cooperation to reduce environmental pollution caused by individual
behaviors); Nolon, supra note 4, at 372–77 (discussing federal–local cooperation in ecosystem management);
Patricia E. Salkin & Ashira Pelman Ostrow, Cooperative Federalism and Wind: A New Framework for
Achieving Sustainability, 37 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1049, 1052–55 (2009) (proposing federal regulation of local
zoning boards to facilitate national wind siting); Salkin, supra note 6, at 392 (discussing federal–local
cooperation in brownfield redevelopment); A. Dan Tarlock, Local Government Protection of Biodiversity:
What Is Its Niche?, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 555, 581–82 (1993) (discussing federal–local cooperation in
biodiversity protection).
29 FRED BOSSELMAN & DAVID CALLIES, COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, THE QUIET REVOLUTION IN
LAND USE CONTROL (1971).
30 See infra note 234.
31 See, e.g., Kayden, supra note 4 (discussing the federal government’s limited role in land-use
planning); Salkin, supra note 6 (describing previous efforts at national land-use reform); Wildermuth, supra
note 16 (describing two failed attempts to bring order to land-use law through national land-use planning); cf.
William F. Pedersen, Using Federal Environmental Regulations to Bargain for Private Land Use Control, 21 YALE
J. ON REG. 1, 21–23 (2004) (identifying political opposition to federal attempts to shape local land use through the
CWA and ESA).
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consistently refused to hear zoning cases, reinforcing the notion that land-use
law is local law.32
In a recent article, Professor William Fischel assessed the evolution of
zoning and concluded that “[t]he most striking quality about zoning is that it is
still local.”33 Professor Fischel observed that, in contrast to zoning, “many
formerly local activities such as road building, public health, care for the poor,
school finance, prosecution of corruption, and water quality regulation (even
drinking water regulation), have been largely pre-empted by the state and
federal government.”34 Most commentators concur, emphasizing a national
understanding that land use is primarily a prerogative of local governments.35
This Part establishes a doctrinal basis and normative justification for
federal land-use law, both of which derive from the cumulative effects of local
land-use decisions on interstate commerce and the national welfare. Section A
provides a context for federal land law by describing the unsuccessful attempt
to nationalize land-use law along with environmental law during the 1970s.
Section B introduces the cumulative effects doctrine that underlies federal
regulation of purely intrastate activity that would, in the aggregate, have a
nontrivial effect on interstate commerce. Section C applies the cumulative
effects doctrine to the NIMBY phenomenon, using affordable housing and
energy infrastructure to illustrate the potentially significant social and
economic costs of cumulative land-use decisions.36
32 See 1 STEVEN H. STEINGLASS, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION IN STATE COURTS § 6:16 (2011) (noting the
reluctance of federal courts to hear zoning cases); Fischel, supra note 4, § 5, at 10 (describing “procedural
barriers to access to the federal courts”); Gregory Overstreet, The Ripeness Doctrine of the Taking Clause: A
Survey of Decisions Showing Just How Far Federal Courts Will Go to Avoid Adjudicating Land Use Cases, 10
J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 91, 92–94 (1994) (arguing that federal courts rely upon the ripeness doctrine to
dismiss land-use cases because “they simply do not like to hear them”).
33 Fischel, supra note 4, § 3, at 4.
34 Id.
35 See supra note 4.
36 WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMICS OF ZONING LAWS: A PROPERTY RIGHTS APPROACH TO
AMERICAN LAND USE CONTROLS 19 (1985) (“The notion that zoning is just a matter of local concern is
incorrect when the cumulative effect of these regulations is considered.”). Professor William Buzbee makes a
similar point in the context of urban sprawl, noting: “Even seemingly local activity such as home building
patterns can generate much larger harms. Viewed in the aggregate, sprawling patterns of development are
expensive for local governments that must invest in infrastructure, schools, and other services as agriculture
and green spaces are converted to residential use.” William W. Buzbee, Recognizing the Regulatory
Commons: A Theory of Regulatory Gaps, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1, 10 (2003); accord Holly Doremus & W. Michael
Hanemann, Of Babies and Bathwater: Why the Clean Air Act’s Cooperative Federalism Framework Is Useful
for Addressing Global Warming, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 799, 828–29 (2008) (arguing that local governments, in the
aggregate, can utilize land-use controls to substantially reduce greenhouse emissions); Kevin M. Stack &
Michael P. Vandenbergh, The One Percent Problem, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1385 (2011) (arguing that federal
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A. The Nonfederalization of Land-Use Law
Less than fifty years ago, environmental regulation, like land-use
regulation, occurred mainly at the local level37: “A few federal laws addressed
unique national concerns such as maintaining the navigability of interstate
waters, but beyond that, federal support for environmental protection was
primarily limited to sponsoring scientific research.”38 During the late 1960s
and early 1970s, Congress turned the traditional allocation of authority on its
head, enacting comprehensive federal environmental statutes, including the
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969;39 the Clean Air Amendments of
1970;40 the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972,41 later
amended by the Clean Water Act of 1977;42 and the Endangered Species Act
of 1973.43 Given the inextricable connection between environmental quality
and land use, a national land-use policy seemed imminent. It was not to be.
In 1970, Senator Henry Jackson introduced the National Land Use Policy
Act (NLUPA) into the U.S. Senate.44 The proposed law sought to engage
public authorities at the national, state, and local levels in cooperative land-use

regulation should account for all of the “one percent” producers of greenhouse gasses that, in the aggregate,
are a substantial source of carbon emissions).
37 See Jonathan H. Adler, Fables of the Cuyahoga: Reconstructing a History of Environmental
Protection, 14 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 89, 95–96 (2002) (describing local efforts to control pollution that
preceded federal regulation); Jonathan H. Adler, Judicial Federalism and the Future of Federal Environmental
Regulation, 90 IOWA L. REV. 377, 381 (2005) [hereinafter Adler, Judicial Federalism] (“Prior to the late
1960s, most environmental concerns were addressed at the state and local level, if they were addressed at
all.”); Robert V. Percival, Environmental Federalism: Historical Roots and Contemporary Models, 54 MD. L.
REV. 1141, 1147–60 (1995) (discussing the history of environmental protection prior to 1970).
38 Benjamin K. Sovacool, The Best of Both Worlds: Environmental Federalism and the Need for Federal
Action on Renewable Energy and Climate Change, 27 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 397, 400 (2008).
39 Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (1970) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4370h (2006)).
40 Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671q).
41 Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387).
42 Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1566 (codified at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387).
43 Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544). Additional
environmental statutes enacted during this period include the Federal Environmental Pesticide Control Act of
1972, Pub. L. No. 92-516, 86 Stat. 973 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 136–136y); the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90 Stat. 2795 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 6901–6992k); the Safe Drinking Water Act, Pub. L. No. 93-523, 88 Stat. 1660 (1974) (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f–300j-26); and the Toxic Substances Control Act, Pub. L. No. 94-469, 90 Stat. 2003
(1976) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2697).
44 See NOREEN LYDAY, THE LAW OF THE LAND: DEBATING NATIONAL LAND USE LEGISLATION 1970–75,
at 5–7 (1976); Kayden, supra note 4, at 448 (discussing Senator Henry Jackson’s failed attempt to pass
NLUPA).
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planning.45 NLUPA would have provided funding for the formulation of state
land-use plans, established a national data system to aid in land-use planning,
and created a single federal agency to monitor federal compliance with state
plans.46 NLUPA faced political opposition and was ultimately defeated in the
House of Representatives.47
A second attempt to coordinate land-use planning on a national scale under
the Clean Air Act paradoxically served to reinforce local land-use authority.
Under the Clean Air Act, states must design state implementation plans (SIPs)
to meet national air-quality and emissions standards.48 In its first iteration, the
Clean Air Act Amendments required states to include “land-use and
transportation controls” in their SIPs if such controls were necessary to achieve
federal air-quality standards.49 Though states that refused or were unable to
comply with this directive risked having their state plans preempted by a
federal implementation plan50 (FIP), both the states and the EPA recognized
that the threat was largely illusory. The EPA lacked the administrative
resources and localized knowledge necessary to directly implement this
program.51

45 Kayden, supra note 4, at 448; John R. Nolon, The National Land Use Policy Act, 13 PACE ENVTL. L.
REV. 519, 522 (1996) (noting that, through NLUPA, Senator Jackson intended to create “a system that would
have infused comprehensiveness, coordination and cooperation into a system that increasingly exhibits conflict
and confusion”). According to the legislative history, the proposed act would have established

a national policy to encourage and assist the several States to more effectively exercise their
constitutional responsibilities for the planning, management, and administration of the Nation’s
land resources through the development and implementation of comprehensive “Statewide
Environmental, Recreational and Industrial Land Use Plans” . . . and management programs
designed to achieve an ecologically and environmentally sound use of the Nation’s land
resources.
S. 3354, 91st Cong. § 402(a) (1970).
46 Salkin, supra note 6, at 384.
47 LYDAY, supra note 44, at 45–47; Bronin, supra note 4, at 262; Nolon, supra note 4, at 367 (noting that
the NLUPA was defeated, “in part[,] because it was regarded as an assault on the independent authority of the
states to control land use”); Salkin, supra note 6, at 384.
48 Clean Air Act § 110(a), 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a) (2006). EPA’s procedure for SIP approval is contained in
40 C.F.R. § 51.101–.105 (2011).
49 Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, sec. 4(a), § 110(a)(2)(B), 84 Stat. 1676, 1680
(amended 1977).
50 Clean Air Act § 110(c)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7410(c)(1).
51 See Dwyer, supra note 19, at 1201 (“EPA sensed both its own political and technical limitations and
the mammoth technical task that the states faced.”).
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In 1977, Congress backtracked, repealing the “land-use” portion of “landuse and transportation controls.”52 In the 1990 amendments, Congress
cautiously imposed new transportation-control requirements in certain
nonattainment areas but did not reinstate the land-use controls. Instead, the
1990 amendments retreated further from land-use regulation, declaring that the
Clean Air Act does not infringe “on the existing authority of counties and cities
to plan or control land use.”53
Not surprisingly, much environmental damage today is caused by
nonpoint-source pollution resulting from land-use decisions that are within the
jurisdictional purview of local governments.54 As the chairman of the Council
on Environmental Quality observed when lobbying on behalf of NLUPA, land
use is “the single most important element affecting the quality of our
environment which remains substantially unaddressed as a matter of national
policy.”55
B. The Cumulative Effects Doctrine
Although there has never been a national land-use policy, federal law has
long been used to account for the cumulative impact of local land-use
decisions. In 1938, Congress passed the Agricultural Adjustment Act.56 The
Act was designed to drive up the price of wheat by strictly limiting the number
of acres of land that could be used for the production of wheat.57 Roscoe
Filburn grew wheat on nearly double the number of acres he was allotted under

52

Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, § 108(a)(2), 91 Stat. 685, 693.
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, sec. 805, § 131, 104 Stat. 2399, 2689
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7431).
54 Nolon, supra note 4, at 365. Nonpoint-source water pollution includes “the runoff from impervious
surfaces such as roofs, driveways, parking lots, and roads; erosion and sedimentation caused by development
activities, including the removal of vegetation and site disturbance; and the movement into water bodies of
fertilizer, pesticides, and herbicides from lawns, golf courses, and farms.” Id. at 369; accord Doremus &
Hanemann, supra note 36, at 828–29 (arguing that local governments, in the aggregate, can utilize land-use
controls to substantially reduce greenhouse emissions); Nolon, supra note 4, at 371 (“Nonpoint source
pollution is the cause of nearly half of the remaining water quality problems in the United States and is
intimately related to land use.” (footnote omitted)); A. Dan Tarlock, The Potential Role of Local Governments
in Watershed Management, 20 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 149, 152 (2002) (describing local control over land uses
that generate nonpoint-source pollution and impact biodiversity).
55 Nolon, supra note 4, at 372 (quoting Henry L. Diamond, Land Use: Environmental Orphan, ENVTL.
F., Jan./Feb. 1993, at 31, 32) (internal quotation marks omitted).
56 Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-430, 52 Stat. 31 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 7 U.S.C.).
57 Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 115 (1942).
53
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the Act.58 Filburn argued that the Act could not apply to the excess wheat he
produced on his land because the wheat was intended for his private use and
would never enter into the stream of commerce.59
In Wickard v. Filburn, the Court unanimously upheld Congress’s power
under the Commerce Clause to impose federal limits on local land use.60
Although the Court agreed that Filburn’s excess wheat would have a negligible
impact on interstate commerce, the Court declined to evaluate this activity in
isolation. Instead, the Court considered Filburn’s activity as part of a larger
economic enterprise and concluded that, in the aggregate, “his contribution,
taken together with that of many others similarly situated,” would have a
substantial impact on interstate commerce.61
The cumulative effects doctrine, also known as the aggregate effects
doctrine or the cumulative impacts doctrine,62 recognizes that “a single activity
that itself has no discernible effect on interstate commerce may still be
regulated [federally] if the aggregate effect of that class of activity has a
substantial impact on interstate commerce.”63 So, for example, Congress may
regulate isolated, intrastate acts of discrimination,64 entirely intrastate credit
transactions,65 surface mining on privately owned land,66 and the consumption
of homegrown medicinal marijuana,67 if it determines that the cumulative
impact of the regulated economic activity substantially interferes with a
national market.68
58

Id. at 114–15.
Id. at 119.
60 Id. at 128–29.
61 Id. at 127–29.
62 J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Climate Change, Dead Zones, and Massive Problems in the Administrative
State: A Guide for Whittling Away, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 59, 93 n.138 (2010).
63 Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cnty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 191 F.3d 845, 850 (7th Cir.
1999), rev’d on other grounds, 531 U.S. 159 (2001); accord United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 119–20
(1941) (noting that Congress may regulate intrastate activity that has a “substantial effect” on interstate
commerce); Ruhl & Salzman, supra note 62, at 93 n.138 (describing the use of the cumulative effects doctrine
in federal law).
64 See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 258 (1964); id. at 276 (Black, J.,
concurring) (considering the aggregate effect of local discriminatory acts on the interstate market); Ruhl &
Salzman, supra note 62, at 93 (noting that employment discrimination cases often consider the cumulative
effects of employment practices and employer statements).
65 Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 154 (1971).
66 Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264, 281 (1981).
67 Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 22 (2005).
68 During the Rehnquist Court’s “federalism revival,” the Court struck down several federal statutes
based upon its determination that the regulated activity, possession of guns near schools in United States v.
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995), and gender-motivated crimes in United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598,
59
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In addition, federal regulation in fields as varied as banking law, securities
law, disability law, discrimination law, and environmental law require
administrative agencies to consider the cumulative effect of individual actions
on federal policy goals.69 For example, in issuing federal permits under section
404 of the CWA, the Army Corps of Engineers does not simply consider the
impact of filling an individual wetland but rather the cumulative impact of
wetlands development.70 Under the ESA, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service is
required to determine whether a proposed action, “taken together with
cumulative effects, is likely to jeopardize the continued existence of listed
species.”71 Similarly, in administering the National Environmental Policy Act,
the Council on Environmental Quality is charged with assessing the
cumulative impacts of proposed actions.72
In contrast to environmental law, traditional land-use law has not been
nationalized. Indeed, “environmental policy and land-use policy in the United
States remain . . . separate and distinct fields, created and implemented by
different levels of governments and studied by different sets of academics and
professionals.”73 The next section addresses some of the implications of this
distinction.
C. The Cumulative Effects of NIMBY: Beyond the Backyard
The local land-use regulatory process is, by design, quite limited in scope.
Land-use plans traditionally account for land located within municipal

617–19 (2000), was not an “economic activity.” Both cases, nonetheless, affirmed the general authority of
Congress to regulate economic activity that “substantially affect[s] interstate commerce.” Lopez, 514 U.S. at
558–59; accord Morrison, 529 U.S. at 609.
69 Ruhl & Salzman, supra note 62, at 93; see also Joseph H. Guth, Cumulative Impacts: Death-Knell for
Cost–Benefit Analysis in Environmental Decisions, 11 BARRY L. REV. 23, 49–52 (2008) (discussing
cumulative impacts in federal environmental legislation, including the Clean Air Act National Ambient Air
Quality Standards, CWA water-quality standards, ESA, and federal cap-and-trade systems).
70 See Ruhl & Salzman, supra note 62, at 95 (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1344(e)(1) (2006)).
71 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(g)(4) (2011); see also Ruhl & Salzman, supra note 62, at 95 n.152 (“The agency
defines cumulative effects as ‘those effects of future State or private activities, not involving Federal activities,
that are reasonably certain to occur within the action area.’” (quoting 50 C.F.R. § 402.02)).
72 40 C.F.R. § 1508.25.
73 Kayden, supra note 4, at 460–62; see also William W. Buzbee, Urban Sprawl, Federalism, and the
Problem of Institutional Complexity, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 57, 98 (1999) (noting that, despite decades of
federal environmental regulation, “land use decisions and processes have remained quintessentially within the
province of local governments”); Keith H. Hirokawa, Sustaining Ecosystem Services Through Local
Environmental Law, 28 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 760, 773–77 (2011) (describing the rise of local environmental
law and contrasting it with traditional federal environmental law); Tarlock, supra note 4, at 652 (highlighting
the regulatory disparity between national environmental objectives and local land-use authority).
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boundaries;74 land-use decisions promote the welfare of the local community,
often at the expense of broader national policies or goals.75 In the late 1960s,
the term “exclusionary zoning”76 was coined to describe the way in which
traditional land-use regulations systematically exclude low-income persons
from many residential communities.77
In addition to the poor, localities routinely use their zoning powers to
exclude an extensive array of locally undesirable land uses, including group
homes for the disabled,78 cell phone towers,79 and distributed-renewableenergy facilities, such as backyard wind turbines and rooftop solar panels.80
This Article, therefore, uses the term “restrictive zoning” to encompass the use

74

See Kayden, supra note 4, at 449–50; Ostrow, supra note 2, at 294.
See Griffith, supra note 6, at 526 (noting that traditional municipal law does not require localities to
consider the extralocal impact of their decisions); Shelley Ross Saxer, Local Autonomy or Regionalism?:
Sharing the Benefits and Burdens of Suburban Commercial Development, 30 IND. L. REV. 659, 659 (1997)
(noting that “[l]and use decisions are generally made solely by local officials elected by and responsible only
to citizens within the local municipality” but nonetheless “impose burdens on citizens outside the local
municipality”).
76 Lawrence Gene Sager, Tight Little Islands: Exclusionary Zoning, Equal Protection, and the Indigent,
21 STAN. L. REV. 767, 767 (1969); Tim Iglesias, Our Pluralist Housing Ethics and the Struggle for
Affordability, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 511, 561 (2007) (“While there is no universally agreed-upon
definition of ‘exclusionary zoning,’ the term generally refers to zoning ordinances and planning codes ‘that
have the intent or effect of excluding disadvantaged groups, particularly low- and moderate-income people and
racial minorities, from a locality.’” (quoting Ken Zimmerman & Arielle Cohen, Exclusionary Zoning:
Constitutional and Federal Statutory Responses, in THE LEGAL GUIDE TO AFFORDABLE HOUSING 39, 41 (Tim
Iglesias & Rochelle E. Lento eds., 2005))).
77 See MICHAEL ALLAN WOLF, THE ZONING OF AMERICA: EUCLID V. AMBLER 143 (2008) (noting that
municipalities are given substantial discretion to use zoning to exclude low-income individuals); Richard
Briffault, Our Localism: Part II—Localism and Legal Theory, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 346, 365–74, 382–84
(1990); William A. Fischel, An Economic History of Zoning and a Cure for Its Exclusionary Effects, 41 URB.
STUD. 317, 326–31 (2004) (describing the growth of single-family residences and local zoning as a means for
excluding low-income individuals).
78 See Peter W. Salsich, Jr., Group Homes, Shelters and Congregate Housing: Deinstitutionalization
Policies and the NIMBY Syndrome, 21 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 413, 418 (1986) (noting local opposition to
a wide variety of group homes, including homes for “the elderly, halfway houses for prisoners, residential
treatment facilities for alcoholics and drug addicts, . . .[homeless] shelters . . . , [and] group homes for the
developmentally disabled”).
79 See Steven J. Eagle, Wireless Telecommunications, Infrastructure Security, and the NIMBY Problem,
54 CATH. U. L. REV. 445, 455–57 (2005) (describing NIMBY opposition to telecommunications towers);
Salkin & Ostrow, supra note 28, at 1088–91 (same).
80 See WOLF, supra note 77, at 147–48; Sara C. Bronin, Curbing Energy Sprawl with Microgrids, 43
CONN. L. REV. 547, 571–72 (2010) (describing local opposition to renewable- and alternative-energy projects,
including wind and solar installations); Troy A. Rule, Renewable Energy and the Neighbors, 2010 UTAH L.
REV. 1223, 1238–42 (discussing local opposition to distributed renewables); Salkin & Ostrow, supra note 28,
at 1067–76 (assessing local opposition to wind turbines).
75
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of the local zoning authority to exclude undesirable facilities, as well as
affordable housing.
That local zoning produces restrictive land-use patterns is hardly surprising.
In Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., the Supreme Court expressly
rejected the notion that a locality should take regional needs into consideration
in devising its zoning ordinances.81 Instead, the Court maintained that “the
village, though physically a suburb of Cleveland, is politically a separate
municipality, with powers of its own and authority to govern itself as it sees fit
within the limits of the organic law of its creation and the State and Federal
Constitutions.”82 The Court’s decision condoned an intentionally parochial
system that relies upon local political boundaries, rather than natural
geographic boundaries, to determine the scope of land-use regulatory
authority.83
Where the local land-use process is dominated by NIMBY sentiment (as is
the case in many elite suburban communities),84 local residents have the
economic incentive and legal authority to exclude undesirable developments,
without regard for the impact on regional or national land-use priorities.85 Even
diverse localities, ones that do not fall within the affluent suburban model, may
have a proclivity toward restrictive zoning. In a recent study of zoning
decisions in New York City, Professors Hills and Schleicher concluded that the
seriatim method that cities use to make land-use decisions systematically
overprotects incumbent land users against new entrants, particularly in highvalue housing areas.86 As Professors Hills and Schleicher observe:

81

272 U.S. 365, 389 (1926).
Id.
83 WOLF, supra note 77, at 137.
84 According to Professor William Fischel, small local governments are often responsive to their largest
and most motivated constituency—homeowners. See FISCHEL, supra note 22, at 5–6; accord Roderick M.
Hills, Jr. & David Schleicher, Balancing the “Zoning Budget,” 61 CASE W. RES. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012)
(manuscript at 11–12), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1816368 (describing homeowner opposition to
new development) (footnotes omitted)).
85 Incumbent property owners tend reflexively to resist all new development, even development that
would increase local property values. Ostrow, supra note 2, at 298–300; Peñalver, supra note 3, at 831–32;
Christopher Serkin, Big Differences for Small Governments: Local Governments and the Takings Clause, 81
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1624, 1655–56 (2006) (arguing that NIMBYs are motivated both by a desire to protect
property values and by a desire to preserve community character); see also Ashira Pelman Ostrow, Minority
Interests, Majority Politics: A Comment on Richard Collins’ “Telluride’s Tale of Eminent Domain, Home
Rule, and Retroactivity,” 86 DENV. U. L. REV. 1459, 1467–68 (2009) (illustrating the impact of NIMBYism in
preventing arguably beneficial facilities from being constructed outside of Telluride).
86 Hills & Schleicher, supra note 84 (manuscript at 9).
82
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The essence of the problem is that the neighbors who are
physically close to parcels proposed for additional housing
generally have strong incentives and organizational capacity to
oppose changes in the zoning status quo. . . . By contrast, the
persons benefited by [these] proposals . . . are dispersed and
disorganized.87
As a result of this asymmetry, the problems of locating development inside a
city frequently parallel those caused by suburban exclusionary zoning.88
While entirely rational from the perspective of an individual homeowner
and of the community,89 restrictive zoning across multiple jurisdictions results
in the systematic exclusion of certain land uses, and users, from large parts of a
region with significant extralocal social and economic consequences. To
illustrate, consider two contexts in which the cumulative impact of restrictive
local zoning policies generates land-use patterns that conflict with national
policy goals: (1) the development of affordable housing and (2) the
development of multijurisdictional physical infrastructure, including energy
infrastructure and telecommunications facilities.
1. Confronting the National Housing Crisis
As the 2007–2008 subprime-mortgage crisis and ensuing economic
recession strikingly revealed, the modern real-estate-finance market is national
in scope.90 When mortgages are securitized, a default in one jurisdiction affects
investors throughout the country, with an obvious impact on interstate
commerce.91 The national foreclosure crisis has “drained household wealth,
87

Id. (manuscript at 5–6).
For an overview of the interplay between NIMBY and affordable housing, see Iglesias, supra note 76,
at 566; and Peter W. Salsich, Jr., Toward a Policy of Heterogeneity: Overcoming a Long History of
Socioeconomic Segregation in Housing, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 459, 497–98 (2007).
89 See Fischel, supra note 4, § 2, at 3 (arguing that NIMBY is a rational homeowner response).
90 See Ann M. Burkhart, Real Estate Practice in the Twenty-First Century, 72 MO. L. REV. 1031, 1033–
34 (2007) (describing the rise of a national and global market for American mortgages); Prentiss Cox,
Foreclosure Reform amid Mortgage Lending Turmoil: A Public Purpose Approach, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 683,
743 (2008) (noting proposals to increase uniformity in foreclosure procedures “to accompany the increasing
national or even global character of real estate finance markets”); Eric M. Marshall, Note, The Protective Scope
of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act: Providing Mortgagors the Protection They Deserve from Abusive
Foreclosure Practices, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1269, 1290 & n.165 (2010) (citing sources that demonstrate that real estate
finance has become national and argue for national regulation).
91 See generally Michael H. Schill, The Impact of the Capital Markets on Real Estate Law and Practice,
32 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 269 (1999) (providing an overview of the way in which real estate markets have been
transformed by securitization of mortgages). On the connection between the securitization of sub-prime
mortgages and the financial crisis, see Shelby D. Green, Disquiet on the Home Front: Disturbing Crises in the
88
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ruined the credit standing of many borrowers and devastated [a
disproportionate number of minority] communities.”92 It has also thrust the
challenge of developing affordable housing back onto the national agenda.
In the wake of the foreclosure crisis, the federal government has enacted a
variety of programs designed to subsidize the development of affordable
housing.93 This flurry of programs is but a continuation of a decades-old
national housing policy aimed at increasing the supply of affordable housing.94
The United States Housing Act of 1937 declared its intent “to promote the
general welfare of the Nation by employing its funds and credit . . . to remedy
the unsafe and insanitary housing conditions and the acute shortage of decent,
safe, and sanitary dwellings for families of low income.”95 Since that time, the
federal government has spent tens of billions of dollars every year on a baffling
array of housing programs and subsidies.96
Nation’s Markets and Institutions, 30 PACE L. REV. 7, 10 (2009) (“High leveraging by poor credit risks in real
estate markets . . . promoted instability in both the housing and financial markets.”); Claire A. Hill, Why Didn’t
Subprime Investors Demand a (Much Larger) Lemons Premium?, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 2011, at 47,
47–48 (discussing the subprime-mortgage crisis as the cause of the current financial and foreclosure crisis);
Katherine L. Lewis, Note, Rebuilding a House of Cards: Envisioning Sustainable Federal Housing Policy, 35
WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 473, 497–98 (2011) (noting that falling home prices and defaults on bad loans damaged
the national subprime-mortgage market, and helped cause a financial crisis).
92 JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV., THE STATE OF THE NATION’S HOUSING 2011, at 4
(2011), available at http://www.995hope.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/SON_2011.pdf; accord Eloisa
Rodriguez-Dod, Stop Shutting the Door on Renters: Protecting Tenants from Foreclosure Evictions, 20 CORNELL
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 243, 269 (2010) (“The foreclosure crisis and its effect on tenants does not just impact the local
community, but has also had a national impact.”); Marshall, supra note 90, at 1289–90 (discussing how foreclosures
have damaged the national economy); Diana A. Silva, Note, Land Banking as a Tool for the Economic
Redevelopment of Older Industrial Cities, 3 DREXEL L. REV. 607, 627–28 (2011) (discussing the foreclosure crisis as
a problem that has spread beyond economically depressed urban cities).
93 See Nicholas J. Brunick & Patrick O’B. Maier, Renewing the Land of Opportunity, 19 J. AFFORDABLE
HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 161, 184–85 (2010) (listing Obama Administration proposals to facilitate
affordable housing); Charles L. Edson, Affordable Housing—An Intimate History, 20 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING
& COMMUNITY DEV. L. 193, 206 (2011) (describing efforts to overcome challenges to the Low Income
Housing Tax Credit); Murray S. Levin, Digest of Selected Articles, 39 REAL EST. L.J. 542, 544–45 (2011)
(describing the National Housing Trust Fund, which was created under the Housing and Economic Recovery
Act of 2008 but is currently unfunded); Lewis, supra note 91, at 499–503 (listing government responses to
housing-market problems, including a commitment to affordable housing).
94 See, e.g., Levin, supra note 93, at 542 (“Since the Great depression, U.S. federal policy has promoted
affordable housing for the poor.”); Lewis, supra note 91, at 483–89 (describing federal efforts to increase
affordable rental housing and home ownership for those with low incomes). See generally Edson, supra note
93 (discussing the history of public housing in the United States).
95 Pub. L. No. 75-412, § 1, 50 Stat. 888, 888 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1437(a)(1)(A) (2006)).
96 David J. Reiss, First Principles for an Effective Federal Housing Policy, 35 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 795, 795
(2010). See generally ALEX F. SCHWARTZ, HOUSING POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES (2d ed. 2010) (surveying
policies and programs designed to provide affordable housing to Americans); Center Mission & Goals, NAT’L
HOUSING CONF., http://www.nhc.org/about/Center-Mission-Goals.html (last visited Aug. 22, 2012) (“[T]he Center
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Despite this expenditure, the gap between supply and demand of affordable
housing continues to grow.97 Even where federal funds are available,
exclusionary zoning policies make it extremely difficult to site affordablehousing developments.98 Euclidean zoning is premised on the notion that
certain high-value land uses should be insulated from other, less desirable land
uses. In Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., the Court famously described
multifamily housing as “a mere parasite, constructed in order to take advantage
of the open spaces and attractive surroundings created by the residential
character of the [single-family] district.”99 Exclusionary zoning ordinances and
planning codes typically exclude multifamily dwellings, impose minimum
building- and lot-size requirements, and restrict the number of permitted
bedrooms.100
The exclusionary pattern of development gained national attention with the
Mount Laurel litigation,101 in which the Supreme Court of New Jersey required
every municipality to provide affordable housing for its “fair share” of the
regional demand.102 In contrast to the Euclid Court, the Mount Laurel court
required municipalities to exercise their land-use regulatory authority to
promote the welfare of the state as a whole, rather than exclusively to benefit
their own residents.103 The ensuing decades have proven that Mount Laurel’s
helps to develop effective policy solutions at the national, state and local levels that increase the availability of
affordable homes.”).
97 JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV., supra note 92, at 27 (“In 1999, 8.5 million extremely
low-income renter households . . . competed for 3.6 million [affordable and available] units . . . . By 2009, the
mismatch had grown to 10.4 million extremely low-income renter households and just 3.7 million affordable and
available units.” (citation omitted)).
98 See Tim Iglesias, Managing Local Opposition to Affordable Housing: A New Approach to NIMBY, 12
J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 78, 79 (2002); Iglesias, supra note 76, at 566 (“Attempts to
site affordable housing in ‘established neighborhoods’ provokes stereotypes of ‘those people’ who, it is feared,
will bring chaos to an otherwise stable and wholesome social order in the neighborhood.”).
99 272 U.S. 365, 394 (1926).
100 Iglesias, supra note 76, at 561; see also Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Exclusionary Amenities in Residential
Communities, 92 VA. L. REV. 437, 452 (2006) (stating that antidiscrimination laws force communities wishing to
exclude to use proxies, such as single-family homes on large lots in the suburbs).
101 See Hills Dev. Co. v. Township of Bernards (Mount Laurel III), 510 A.2d 621 (N.J. 1986); S. Burlington
Cnty. NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel (Mount Laurel II), 456 A.2d 390 (N.J. 1983); S. Burlington Cnty.
NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel (Mount Laurel I), 336 A.2d 713 (N.J. 1975); see also Salsich, supra note 88,
at 473 (“The Mount Laurel litigation and similar efforts in other states became the focal point for advocates of
affordable housing . . . because the Supreme Court had ruled a few years earlier that there was no federal
constitutional right to housing.”).
102 Mount Laurel I, 336 A.2d at 724–25.
103 See id. at 726 (“[W]hen regulation does have a substantial external impact, the welfare of the state’s
citizens beyond the borders of the particular municipality cannot be disregarded and must be recognized and
served.”).
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fair-share approach is the exception, rather than the rule. The regional
approach to affordable housing has been difficult to implement in New Jersey
itself104 and has been ignored by the vast majority of states.105
2. The Infrastructure Challenge
a. Energy Security as a National Policy Goal
On August 14, 2003, cascading power failures swept across the
northeastern United States and parts of Canada, raising serious concerns over
the security and reliability of the nation’s energy infrastructure.106 Energy
security has been a national policy goal for more than thirty-five years.107
Every President from Richard Nixon to Barack Obama has made transitioning
to a clean-energy economy a national priority.108 Congress has supported the
development of renewable energy through legislation such as the Public Utility
Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (PURPA), which required utilities to purchase
electricity generated from qualifying facilities, including alternative

104 See David N. Kinsey, The Growth Share Approach to Mount Laurel Housing Obligations: Origins,
Hijacking, and Future, 63 RUTGERS L. REV. 867 (2011) (discussing the battle over the formula for determining
affordable-housing needs in New Jersey); Alan Mallach, The Mount Laurel Doctrine and the Uncertainties of Social
Policy in a Time of Retrenchment, 63 RUTGERS L. REV. 849, 851–59 (2011) (detailing many challenges to the
implementation of the New Jersey Fair Housing Act since 2002); Matthew Shiers Sternman, Note, Integrating the
Suburbs: Harnessing the Benefits of Mixed-Income Housing in Westchester County and Other Low-Poverty Areas,
44 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 1, 13–18 (2010) (noting factors that have thwarted the New Jersey Fair Housing
Act’s effectiveness).
105 See John J. Delaney, Addressing the Workforce Housing Crisis in Maryland and Throughout the
Nation: Do Land Use Regulations that Preclude Reasonable Housing Opportunity Based upon Income Violate
the Individual Liberties Protected by State Constitutions?, 33 U. BALT. L. REV. 153, 170–76 (2004) (discussing
efforts to curtail affordable housing in several states); Harold A. McDougall, From Litigation to Legislation in
Exclusionary Zoning, 22 HARV. C.R.–C.L. L. REV. 623, 623–25 (1987) (noting that a strong local preference
for the ability to exclude renders state courts and state legislatures reluctant to address exclusionary zoning);
Henry A. Span, How the Courts Should Fight Exclusionary Zoning, 32 SETON HALL L. REV. 1, 72 (2001)
(describing the New Jersey courts’ success as “marginal” and noting that no other state court has gone as far as
the Supreme Court of New Jersey in encouraging affordable housing).
106 See Joshua P. Fershee, Misguided Energy: Why Recent Legislative, Regulatory, and Market Initiatives
Are Insufficient to Improve the U.S. Energy Infrastructure, 44 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 327, 328 (2007); see also
U.S.–CAN. POWER SYS. OUTAGE TASK FORCE, FINAL REPORT ON THE AUGUST 14, 2003 BLACKOUT IN THE
UNITED STATES AND CANADA: CAUSES AND RECOMMENDATIONS 17–19 (2004), available at https://reports.
energy.gov/BlackoutFinal-Web.pdf (describing causes of the cascading blackout).
107 E. Donald Elliott, Why the U.S. Does Not Have a Renewable Energy Policy 2 (John M. Olin Ctr. for
Studies in Law, Econ., and Pub. Policy, Research Paper No. 433, 2011), available at papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1878616.
108 Id.; see also State of the Union 2011, WHITE HOUSE, http://www.whitehouse.gov/state-of-the-union2011 (last visited Aug. 22, 2012).
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generators,109 and the Production Tax Credit (PTC), which subsidized the
development of wind energy.110 Moreover, renewable energy consistently
receives overwhelming bipartisan support in national polls.111
In recent years, significant increases in installed wind capacity112 and
domestic production of oil and gas have reduced reliance on foreign imports
and inched the United States closer to achieving its energy goals.113 Yet,
restrictive zoning and NIMBYism continue to hinder the development of
nationwide energy infrastructure.114 Siting is particularly important to the
development of renewable energy. In contrast to traditional generating
facilities, which could be built close to demand centers, renewable-energy
generators must be built near renewable resources. Often these resources are
located in remote areas, far from existing transmission lines.115 Thus, in
addition to siting wind turbines and solar panels, a key challenge for renewable

109 Pub. L. No. 95-617, § 210(a), 92 Stat. 3117, 3144 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3 (2006));
see also Garrick B. Pursley & Hannah J. Wiseman, Local Energy, 60 EMORY L.J. 877, 909–11 (2011)
(describing federal policies that subsidize development of renewables); Jim Rossi, The Limits of a National
Renewable Portfolio Standard, 42 CONN. L. REV. 1425, 1427 (2010).
110 Energy Policy Act of 1992 § 1914(a), 26 U.S.C. § 45(a); see also Jeffry S. Hinman, The Green
Economic Recovery: Wind Energy Tax Policy After Financial Crisis and the American Recovery and
Reinvestment Tax Act of 2009, 24 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 35, 60 (2009) (crediting the PTC for encouraging
growth of installed wind capacity).
111 See Energy, POLLINGREPORT.COM, http://www.pollingreport.com/energy.htm (last visited Aug. 22,
2012) (collecting data from a CNN/Opinion Research Corporation poll indicating that 83% of people favor
greater reliance on wind power, a Pew Research Center study indicating that 74% of people favor increased
federal funding of wind power, a Pew Research/National Journal Congressional Connection poll indicating
that 78% of people favor adoption of federal RPS, and an ABC News/Washington Post poll indicating that
87% of people favor developing more solar and wind power).
112 U.S. Dep’t of Energy, U.S. Installed Wind Capacity, WIND POWERING AM., http://www.
windpoweringamerica.gov/wind_installed_capacity.asp#current (last updated Apr. 2, 2012) (stating that,
between 1999 and 2011, installed wind capacity in the United States increased from approximately 2500 MW
to nearly 47,000 MW).
113 Clifford Krauss & Eric Lipton, U.S. Inches Toward Goal of Energy Independence, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
23, 2012, at A1; see also INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, CLEAN ENERGY PROGRESS REPORT: IEA INPUT TO THE
CLEAN ENERGY MINISTERIAL 44–58 (2011).
114 See Steven J. Eagle, Securing a Reliable Electricity Grid: A New Era in Transmission Siting
Regulation?, 73 TENN. L. REV. 1 (2005) (assessing transmission-siting challenges and remedies provided by
the Energy Policy Act of 2005); Outka, supra note 6, at 288 (“[E]ntrenched ‘devolved federalism’ in the land
use context contributes to the persistent disconnection between land use and the larger energy policy
discourse.”); Chi-Jen Yang, Electrical Transmission: Barriers and Policy Solutions 16–18 (CCPP Tech. Policy
Brief Series, Paper No. 09-06, 2009), available at http://www.nicholas.duke.edu/ccpp/ccpp_pdfs/
transmission.pdf.
115 See Salkin & Ostrow, supra note 28, at 1062.
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energy is siting new interstate transmission lines linking electric generators to
population centers.116
In the Energy Act of 2005117 (EPAct), Congress granted FERC the
authority to preempt state siting authority for certain transmission lines and for
liquefied-natural-gas (LNG) terminals.118 Thus far, FERC has not had much
success siting transmission lines119 or liquefied-natural-gas-terminals.120
Navigating the decentralized siting process continues to hinder the
development of a modern, secure smart grid.
b. Process Preemption in Telecommunications Siting
A decade earlier a similar tension between local land-use authority and
national land-use priorities prompted Congress to include a National Wireless
Telecommunications Siting Policy as part of the Telecommunications Act of
1996.121 The Telecommunications Siting Policy bridges the national–local
116

See Eagle, supra note 114, at 2–3; Klass & Wilson, supra note 6 (manuscript at 41–42); Jim Rossi, The
Trojan Horse of Electric Power Transmission Line Siting Authority, 39 ENVTL. L. 1015, 1016 (2009) (noting
that existing transmission grids cannot accommodate additional renewable-energy resources); Salkin &
Ostrow, supra note 28, at 1062–63 (describing obstacles to wind energy, including NIMBY, inadequate
transmission, and the intermittent nature of wind as an energy source).
117 Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 16, 22, 26, and 42
U.S.C.).
118 See Energy Policy Act of 2005 sec. 1221(a), § 216(b), 16 U.S.C. § 824p(b) (2006) (providing FERC
with power to preempt state siting authority in “national interest electric transmission corridor[s]”); see also
Jacob Dweck et al., Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) Litigation After the Energy Policy Act of 2005: State Powers
in LNG Terminal Siting, 27 ENERGY L.J. 473, 474 (2006); R. Seth Davis, Note, Conditional Preemption,
Commandeering, and the Values of Cooperative Federalism: An Analysis of Section 216 of EPAct, 108
COLUM. L. REV. 404, 408 n.29 (2008) (“Concerns about the deleterious effects of local holdup, or
a . . . NIMBY[] mentality, appear throughout the legislative history of EPAct.” (citing H.R. REP. No. 108-65,
pt. 1, at 170 (2003); and 151 CONG. REC. S7267 (daily ed. June 23, 2005) (statement of Sen. Craig L.
Thomas))).
119 Klass & Wilson, supra note 6 (manuscript at 12); Rossi, supra note 116, at 1033–35.
120 See Joan M. Darby et al., The Role of FERC and the States in Approving and Siting Interstate Natural
Gas Facilities and LNG Terminals After the Energy Policy Act of 2005—Consultation, Preemption and
Cooperative Federalism, 6 TEX. J. OIL GAS & ENERGY L. 335, 339, 384 (2010–2011) (concluding that the
changes enacted pursuant to EPAct have not made the LNG approval process quicker or more organized);
Sheila Slocum Hollis, Liquefied Natural Gas: “The Big Picture” for Future Development in North America, 2
ENVTL. & ENERGY L. & POL’Y J. 5, 18, 22 (2007) (explaining that local opposition to LNG terminal
construction is common); James C. Erdle, Jr., Note, Controlling LNG: AES Sparrows Point LNG, LLC v.
Smith, 527 F.3d 120 (4th Cir. 2008), 29 ENERGY L.J. 695, 702 (2008) (concluding that deference to states’
coastal-zone-management plans enables states to block construction of LNG terminals); Public Concerns, FED.
ENERGY REG. COMMISSION, http://ferc.gov/industries/gas/indus-act/lng/public.asp (last updated June 28, 2010)
(describing reasons for controversy surrounding proposed LNG terminals).
121 See Ostrow, supra note 2, at 292–93 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 104-204, pt. 1, at 94 (1995), reprinted in
1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 10, 61).
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divide using what I have previously described as “process preemption” to
streamline the telecommunications-siting and permitting process.122 In a
process-preemption regime, Congress imposes baseline federal requirements
on the local siting process.123 Within the federal framework, local officials
retain substantial discretion to shape and customize the broad federal policy
guidelines in response to community preferences.124
Prior to the passage of the Telecommunications Siting Policy, inconsistent
local permitting processes and strong local opposition significantly delayed
and often prevented cell-phone-tower siting.125 Recognizing the importance of
developing a nationwide telecommunications network, the House of
Representatives first considered granting the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) exclusive siting authority over telecommunications towers.
The House Facilities Siting Policies called for the FCC to establish a
negotiated rule-making committee to develop substantive policies related to
wireless-facilities siting that would consider both the national interest in
enhancing coverage and the legitimate interests of state and local governments
in regulating the use of land within their own borders.126 Like the EPAct, this
proposal would have entirely preempted the local land-use process, replacing
local zoning officials with federal administrative agents. In contrast, the
corresponding Senate bill would have left siting authority exclusively under
the control of local authorities.127
The House–Senate conference committee adopted a compromise, enacting
a Telecommunications Siting Policy that imposes federal constraints on the
siting process but leaves primary siting authority in the hands of local
regulators.128 The Siting Policy, thus, allows local regulators to tailor the
policy to local conditions and to experiment with siting standards and
122

Ostrow, supra note 2.
Id. at 289.
124 According to the conference committee report, “The conference agreement creates a new section 704
which prevents Commission preemption of local and State land use decisions and preserves the authority of
State and local governments over zoning and land use matters except in the limited circumstances set forth in
the conference agreement.” H.R. REP. NO. 104-458, at 207–08 (1996) (Conf. Rep.).
125 See Ostrow, supra note 2, at 317.
126 See H.R. REP. NO. 104-204, pt. 1, at 25.
127 See S. 652, 104th Cong. (1996) (making no mention of telecommunications siting). See generally
Petersburg Cellular P’ship v. Bd. of Supervisors, 205 F.3d 688, 697–98 (4th Cir. 2000) (per curiam) (noting
the difference between the House version, which would have empowered the FCC to directly regulate the
siting of towers, and the Senate version, which would have allowed local zoning officials to retain that
authority).
128 Ostrow, supra note 2, at 318.
123
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strategies.129 Procedurally, the Telecommunications Siting Policy requires that
local governments respond to any siting application “within a reasonable
period of time”130 and that a local government decision to deny a permit “be in
writing and supported by substantial evidence contained in a written record.”131
Under the Telecommunications Siting Policy, state and local governments
retain almost complete authority over the substance of local zoning codes. The
Siting Policy imposes three substantive constraints on local decision making,
preempting local siting decisions that “unreasonably discriminate among
providers of functionally equivalent services,”132 “prohibit[] the provision of
personal wireless services,”133 or vary from FCC regulations governing radiofrequency emissions.134 Though siting decisions must be supported by
“substantial evidence contained in a written record,” the decision itself is made
in accordance with substantive state and local law.135 In essence, the
Telecommunications Siting Policy sets out the degree of evidence needed to
support the zoning decision but does not dictate what type of evidence must be
considered.136
As an empirical matter, the TCA’s process-preemption regime has been a
success; since 1996, the number of cell phone towers sited across the country
has increased exponentially.137 The sophisticated national telecommunications
network stands in stark contrast to the antiquated and inadequate energytransmission grid. Yet many questions remain unanswered. Indeed, the
questions have yet to be asked: How does the siting policy work? Why does it
work? What are the costs and benefits of this regulatory framework as

129 See id. at 305, 319 (describing how states can experiment with cell-tower siting within the confines of
the Telecommunications Siting Policy).
130 Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 704(a), 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(ii) (2006).
131 Id. § 332(c)(7)(B)(iii).
132 Id. § 332(c)(7)(B)(i)(I)–(II).
133 Id. § 332(c)(7)(B)(i)(II).
134 Id. § 332(c)(7)(B)(iv).
135 See Eagle, supra note 79, at 477 (“[F]ederal law specifies the degree or quantum of evidence needed to
legitimize, under federal law, the exercise of legislative powers devolved upon local boards, under state law, to
enforce substantive rights established by state law.”); see also Susan Lorde Martin, Wind Farms and NIMBYs:
Generating Conflict, Reducing Litigation, 20 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 427, 433–34 (2010) (citing cases
holding that substantial evidence must be based on existing state and local law).
136 See USCOC of Greater Mo. v. City of Ferguson, 583 F.3d 1035, 1042 (8th Cir. 2009); T-Mobile Cent.,
LLC v. Unified Gov’t, 546 F.3d 1299, 1307 (10th Cir. 2008); U.S. Cellular Tel., L.L.C. v. City of Broken
Arrow, 340 F.3d 1122, 1133 (10th Cir. 2003); New Par v. City of Saginaw, 301 F.3d 390, 398 (6th Cir. 2002);
Town of Amherst v. Omnipoint Commc’ns Enters., 173 F.3d 9, 14–16 (1st Cir. 1999).
137 Ostrow, supra note 2, at 293.
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compared with alternative strategies? The next Part considers these
foundational questions to develop a theory of land law federalism.
II. FEDERAL LAND LAW: OF MONEY AND POWER
Notwithstanding the rhetoric of local control, modern land-use law
involves a significant, though poorly understood, national dimension. Given
the variation in form and substance, it might appear, as others have observed,
that the federal patchwork lacks internal coherence or underlying logic.138 This
Part argues that the disparate strands of federal land law are, in fact, bound
together by a common objective—to account for the cumulative impact of
local land-use decisions. In this way, federal land laws counterbalance the
development that would result from unfettered local control.
To differentiate between various modes of federal regulation, this Part
categorizes federal land laws along substantive and procedural axes.
Substantively, federal laws can be classified as (1) pro-development,
subsidizing land use that would be overly restricted by local governments, or
(2) anti-development, restricting land use that would be excessively permitted
by local governments. Procedurally, federal land laws are implemented either
(1) directly, by a federal administrative agency, or (2) indirectly, by local
officials serving as federal agents.
The notion that nonfederal regulators can, and do, implement federal law is
not new.139 Under the Supreme Court’s commandeering doctrine, as developed
in New York v. United States140 and Printz v. United States,141 “[t]he Federal
Government may neither issue directives requiring the States to address
particular problems, nor command the States’ officers, or those of their
political subdivisions, to administer or enforce a federal regulatory
program.”142
138

See supra notes 15–17.
See Abbe R. Gluck, Intrastatutory Federalism and Statutory Interpretation: State Implementation of
Federal Law in Health Reform and Beyond, 121 YALE L.J. 534, 565–66 (2011) (using legislation theory to
analyze the varying roles that state actors play in implementing federal statutes); Hills, supra note 24, at 815
(analyzing the utility to the federal government of enlisting state actors to accomplish federal objectives); Erin
Ryan, Negotiating Federalism, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1, 64–65 (2011) (describing state and local implementation of
federal policy).
140 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
141 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
142 Id. at 935. To be sure, the boundaries of the commandeering doctrine are murky. In Reno v. Condon,
528 U.S. 141 (2000), the Court held that a federal statute that prohibited state motor vehicle departments from
selling drivers’ personal information did not commandeer state officials. As other scholars have noted, it is not
139
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Congress, however, may offer incentives—financial and regulatory—to
persuade states to legislate in accordance with federal interests.143
Traditionally, these mechanisms have been called “cooperative,” although
commentators have long noted the noncooperative, or coercive, elements of
these regimes.144 As Professor Roderick Hills first observed:
There are two mechanisms by which non-federal
governments become the agencies of the Congress: first, the
Congress can hire state and local officials with federal grants-inaid, and, second, the federal government can allow state or local
law to displace federal regulation that would otherwise preempt
such non-federal law if the non-federal law meets the standards
established by Congress.145
To avoid commandeering concerns, federal policies that are implemented
directly by local officials rely upon conditional spending (money) and/or
conditional preemption (power) to encourage local land-use regulators to
implement federal law.146 Moreover, federal land laws utilize two distinct
forms of conditional preemption. The first, which I label the “federalregulation model,” encourages local implementation by threatening to replace

clear why “[s]tate authority implicated in performing a background check on state citizens is protected, but
state authority implicated in gathering and reporting information about state citizens (e.g., missing children to
the federal government, or drivers’ information to willing buyers) is not.” Ryan, supra note 27, at 548; accord
Erwin Chemerinsky, Empowering States: A Rebuttal to Dr. Greve, 33 PEPP. L. REV. 91, 93–94 (2005).
143 See New York, 505 U.S. at 166–69; Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Dissecting the State: The Use of Federal
Law to Free State and Local Officials from State Legislatures’ Control, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1201, 1204 n.12
(1999) (describing cooperative federalism as “intergovernmental cooperation . . . under which nonfederal
officials implement federal policy”).
144 See Adler, Judicial Federalism, supra note 37, at 385; Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken,
Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE L.J. 1256, 1284–91 (2009) (exploring the potential benefits of
uncooperative state regimes).
145 Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Federalism in Constitutional Context, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 181, 184
(1998). Professor Hills also notes that “Congress may allow non-federal governments to enforce its regulations
only if they meet federal standards, and Congress may encourage non-federal governments to submit
implementation plans by subsidizing the cost of implementation with federal grants.” Id.
146 New York, 505 U.S. at 176. In New York, New York State challenged a provision of the Low Level
Radioactive Waste Policy Act that required states to either (1) regulate low-level radioactive waste according
to federal standards or (2) take title to and assume liability for waste produced within the state’s borders. Id. at
174–75. The Court determined that Congress lacked the power to enact either of these options as mandatory,
independent legislation and therefore could not force the states to choose between the two, noting that a
“choice between two unconstitutionally coercive regulatory techniques is no choice at all.” Id. at 176. The
Court, therefore, struck down the take-title provision for “commandeer[ing]” the state regulatory apparatus in
violation of the Tenth Amendment. Id. at 175–77.
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state law with federal law.147 The second form, which I call the “marketalternative model,” encourages local implementation by threatening to leave
the area unregulated, subject only to the free market.148
There are a variety of reasons why Congress chooses to regulate through
the states, rather than regulating directly.149 Perhaps the most basic is as
Professor Erin Ryan explains: “Congress creates programs of cooperative
federalism in commerce-related realms it could manage from top to bottom—
but chooses not to, because the federal government lacks the local expertise,
regulatory authority, boots on the ground, or perceived legitimacy—in short,
the capacity—that state government can provide.”150
At the outset of this undertaking, a disclaimer is in order. This Part
develops a theoretical framework for federal land law. I do not propose a
single model or advocate the adoption of a comprehensive national land-use
policy along the lines of the failed NLUPA.151 The first is impossible for
practical reasons—by its very nature, land resists generalization.152 The second
is unlikely for political reasons. As Congress’s failure to pass climate change
legislation reveals, there is little political support for centralization through
federal legislation.153 Instead, this Part is my initial foray into the theory of
land law federalism.
147 See, e.g., Clean Water Act § 402, 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (2006 & Supp. II 2008) (allowing states to submit
national pollutant discharge elimination system (NPDES) regulatory plans for federal approval but preempting
states with federal enforcement of NPDES regulations in the event of state refusal to submit a plan); Clean Air
Act § 107, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7407, 7409 (2006) (inviting states to enforce national ambient-air-quality standards
through state implementation plans but providing for federal implementation plans).
148 See Petersburg Cellular P’ship v. Bd. of Supervisors, 205 F.3d 688, 703–04 (4th Cir. 2000) (per
curiam) (characterizing the Telecommunications Act as presenting the states with a choice between regulating
cell-phone-tower siting in accordance with federal standards or ceasing all regulation of cell-phone-tower
siting); see also FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 766 (1982) (upholding the use of conditional preemption
even where Congress “fail[s] to provide an alternative regulatory mechanism to police the area in the event of
state default” (emphasis added)).
149 See Gluck, supra note 139, at 565 (summarizing strategic and functional reasons for federal reliance on
state implementation of federal programs).
150 Ryan, supra note 139, at 90.
151 See supra notes 44–47.
152 See infra Part III.C.
153 See American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. (2009) (passing the House
with a vote of 219 to 212 but failing to reach a vote in the Senate); Jonathan H. Adler, Heat Expands All Things: The
Proliferation of Greenhouse Gas Regulation Under the Obama Administration, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 421,
437 (2011) (criticizing the EPA for only regulating carbon emissions from sources deemed “politically acceptable”);
Vivian E. Thomson & Vicki Arroyo, Upside-Down Cooperative Federalism: Climate Change Policymaking and the
States, 29 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 54–59 (2011) (analyzing state and federal resistance to centralization through
comprehensive climate change and energy legislation).

OSTROW GALLEYS3

1424

8/24/2012 1:34 PM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 61:1397

A. Federal Implementation
1. Federal Permitting Schemes
Federal permitting requirements restrict the development of privately
owned property, including wetlands and endangered species habitats. For
example, section 404 of the CWA requires landowners to obtain federal
permits from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to discharge dredge and fill
materials into “waters of the United States.”154 The regulations state that
“[m]ost wetlands constitute a productive and valuable public resource, the
unnecessary alteration or destruction of which should be discouraged as
contrary to the public interest.”155
Section 9 of the ESA similarly prohibits activities affecting protected
species and their habitats, even if privately owned, unless authorized by a
permit from the Fish and Wildlife Service or the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration.156 To obtain a permit under the ESA, landowners
and developers must prepare habitat-conservation plans that fully describe
proposed land-development activities and demonstrate measures that will
mitigate their adverse impact on endangered or threatened species.157
Federal permitting schemes are generally effective at preventing undesired
development;158 however, critics argue that single-purpose federal agencies are
overly zealous in administering the schemes, restricting even socially
beneficial development,159 and that direct federal regulation intrudes upon

154 Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, sec. 2, § 404, 86 Stat.
816, 884 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (2006)); see also 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (defining “navigable
waters” as “waters of the United States”); 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(a) (2011).
155 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(b)(1).
156 Pub. L. No. 93-205, § 9, 87 Stat. 884, 893 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 1538); see also Adler,
Judicial Federalism, supra note 37, at 383.
157 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2)(A).
158 See OFFICE OF WATER, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, NATIONAL WATER PROGRAM: BEST PRACTICES AND END
OF YEAR PERFORMANCE REPORT, FISCAL YEAR 2011, at 85 (2012) (finding that the EPA met its goals for 2011,
achieving no net loss of wetlands, and that the EPA had exceeded its commitment on number of acres restored in
every year since 2004); Martin F.J. Taylor et al., The Effectiveness of the Endangered Species Act: A Quantitative
Analysis, 55 BIOSCIENCE 360 (2005) (analyzing the effectiveness of the ESA and finding positive correlation
between protection under the ESA and increasing population of endangered species).
159 See Zygmunt J.B. Plater, Endangered Species Act Lessons over 30 Years, and the Legacy of the Snail
Darter, a Small Fish in a Pork Barrel, 34 ENVTL. L. 289, 302–03 (2004) (noting that opponents of the ESA
have claimed that it harms “human economic welfare” by restraining development); J.B. Ruhl, Section 7(a)(1)
of the “New” Endangered Species Act: Rediscovering and Redefining the Untapped Power of Federal
Agencies’ Duty to Conserve Species, 25 ENVTL. L. 1107, 1137–39 (1995) (describing objections of property
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local autonomy.160 Unlike locally elected officials, federal administrators are
not politically accountable to the local community and therefore have less
incentive to take local preferences into consideration. Thus, even where federal
programs enable federal regulators to modify uniform rules through case-bycase permitting schemes, as under the CWA and the ESA, “vast geographical
and metaphorical distances separate Washington bureaucrats from the local
contexts in which land-use decisions are typically made, and where their
consequences, at least on the cost side, are most keenly felt.”161
2. Federal Siting Regimes
In contrast to federal permitting schemes, which intentionally restrict
development, federal siting regimes promote growth by subsidizing the
development of specific land uses. Several federal siting regimes preempt the
local zoning process and vest siting authority exclusively in a federal
administrative agency. For example, the EPAct grants FERC exclusive
authority to site LNG terminals.162 Despite this authority, commentators
observe that state and local actors continue to resist LNG siting, using
litigation and drawn-out permitting processes to delay or prevent the
development of these facilities.163
The Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982164 (NWPA), perhaps the poster
child for a failed federal land-use policy, similarly preempts the local zoning
process. The NWPA, as amended, charged the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission with licensing a single national repository for high-level

rights advocates to the ESA and the CWA); David Sunding & David Zilberman, The Economics of
Environmental Regulation by Licensing: An Assessment of Recent Changes to the Wetland Permitting Process,
42 NAT. RESOURCES J. 59, 79–80 (2002) (discussing changes to the federal wetland-permitting process and
projecting higher costs for private developers that could make some projects economically infeasible).
160 See Pedersen, supra note 31, at 21–23 (identifying political opposition to federal attempts to shape
local land use through the CWA and the ESA).
161 Karkkainen, supra note 19, at 80; accord Dwyer, supra note 19, at 1218 (noting intense conflict over
land use at local levels because burdens of use are felt most directly by those living near the land); Hills &
Schleicher, supra note 84 (manuscript at 10) (“[L]and use disputes involve geographically concentrated harms
and widely geographically dispersed benefits . . . .”); Ostrow, supra note 2, at 297; Rose, supra note 4, at 911
(suggesting that land-use decisions are made at the local level, in part, because these decisions are felt most
deeply within the neighborhood).
162 Energy Policy Act of 2005 § 311(c)(2), 15 U.S.C. 717b(e)(1).
163 See supra note 117–20.
164 Pub. L. No. 97-425, 96 Stat. 2201 (1983) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 10101–10270).
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radioactive waste at Yucca Mountain, Nevada.165 From the outset, the Yucca
Mountain project faced intense state and local opposition.166 In 2009, nearly
two decades after the site was selected and billions had been spent studying it,
the Department of Energy terminated its plans for the Yucca Mountain
project.167
Because the sample size is so small, and the targeted land use so
unavoidably risky, it is difficult to generalize from the federal experience siting
LNG terminals and hazardous-waste facilities to other land-use facilities. It is
quite possible that federal administrative agencies have the capacity to site less
hazardous facilities more effectively. Nonetheless, in comparison to the
alternative local-official-as-federal-agent approach, federal implementation is
likely to be more costly and to produce less optimal results. Section B turns to
the local-official-as-federal-agent alternative.
B. Local Implementation
1. Conditional Funding
When Congress seeks to encourage a state to legislate in accordance with
national interests, it may, under its spending power, condition federal funding
upon cooperation with the national program.168 Although there is a point at
which conditional funding becomes coercive, in South Dakota v. Dole, the
Supreme Court embraced an expansive understanding of Congress’s spending
power, noting that the Spending Clause empowers Congress to impose
conditions on the use of federal funds “to further broad policy objectives by
conditioning receipt of federal moneys upon compliance by the recipient with
federal statutory and administrative directives.”169
165

Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 § 113(a), 42 U.S.C. § 10133(a); Richard C. Kearney, Low-Level
Radioactive Waste Management: Environmental Policy, Federalism, and New York, PUBLIUS, Summer 1993,
at 57, 59–60.
166 See Marta Adams, Yucca Mountain—Nevada’s Perspective, 46 IDAHO L. REV. 423, 438–42 (2010)
(describing the controversy in Nevada and the delays caused by scientific and environmental studies, and
judicial and administrative challenges); Kearney, supra note 165, at 60 (describing the contentious siting
process at Yucca Mountain).
167 Ostrow, supra note 2, at 310–12.
168 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 166–68 (1992); Hills, supra note 145, at 184.
169 483 U.S. 203, 206 (1987) (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 474 (1980) (plurality
opinion)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Some scholars have urged the Court to impose stricter limits on
congressional power under the Spending Clause. See, e.g., Lynn A. Baker & Mitchell N. Berman, Getting Off
the Dole: Why the Court Should Abandon Its Spending Doctrine, and How a Too-Clever Congress Could
Provoke It to Do So, 78 IND. L.J. 459, 483–85 (2003).
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Conditional funding does not commandeer state officials because states can
opt out of the funding program and refuse to follow federal directives.
Professor Buzbee explains that, “[w]hen a variety of targeted grants or
subsidies are available or vulnerable to loss, states and local governments can
seek the particular array of programmatic supports that best meet a
jurisdiction’s interests.”170 Importantly, while conditional spending seeks to
guide state and local decision making, the decision-making authority itself
remains in the hands of local regulators. Thus, conditional spending schemes
leave state and local governments with significantly more discretion than
would be the case if the federal government regulated land directly.
Federal grants and spending programs have been used to promote local
development in accordance with national environmental, economic, and
welfare policy goals. For example, federal transportation policies require state
and local officials to engage in land-use planning as a condition to receipt of
federal highway funds.171 The Clean Air Act similarly conditions federal
highway funds upon states’ adoption of air-pollution-control plans that meet
federal requirements.172 The CWA provides states with federal funds to
encourage local land-use planning to prevent nonpoint-source pollution,173
while the Coastal Barrier Resources Act denies aid for developments in
sensitive coastal areas.174
In addition, several federal programs bypass the states and channel funds
directly to local political units. The federal Transportation Equity Act for the
21st Century provides regional transportation-planning agencies with the
authority to fund projects that reduce traffic congestion, to acquire scenic
easements, and to create bicycle trails.175 Federal housing programs provide
substantial subsidies to special local government agencies, called housing

170

Buzbee, supra note 73, at 108.
See 23 U.S.C. § 134(i)(4)(A) (2006) (requiring metropolitan-planning organizations to consult with
state and local land-use agencies to develop long-range transportation plans). As Professor John Nolon has
observed, “The enigma embodied in this requirement is easily described: it requires regional transportation
agencies to achieve consistency with land use plans that are predominantly local in nature and not consistent
with one another at the regional level.” Nolon, supra note 4, at 368 n.14.
172 Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977 sec. 129(b), § 176(c)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7506(c)(1); see also Adler,
Judicial Federalism, supra note 37, at 436–37 (noting that the tenuous connection between highway funds and
the Clean Air Act makes this provision vulnerable to federalism challenges under the Spending Clause).
173 Clean Water Act § 317(c), 33 U.S.C. § 1281(g)(1).
174 Coastal Barrier Resources Act § 2(b), 16 U.S.C. § 3501(b).
175 Pub. L. No. 105-178, 112 Stat. 107 (1998) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 23 U.S.C.).
171

OSTROW GALLEYS3

1428

8/24/2012 1:34 PM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 61:1397

authorities, to enable these authorities to develop and manage housing projects
with below-market rent.176
Although the early federal housing projects had mixed results,177
subsequent federal policies aimed at developing mixed-income communities178
and included funding for the development of regional and local land-use
plans.179 Federal funding for regional land-use planning declined in the
1980s180 but was revived in 2009 with the formation of the Partnership for
Sustainable Communities, an interagency partnership between the U.S.
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), the U.S. Department
of Transportation (DOT), and the EPA.181 The Partnership coordinates a host
of discretionary grant programs,182 including the Sustainable Communities
Initiative, which supports “regional planning efforts that integrate housing and
transportation decisions, and increase the capacity of communities to
modernize land use and zoning plans.”183

176 See, e.g., United States Housing Act of 1937, Pub. L. No. 75-412, 50 Stat. 888 (codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. § 1437–1437f); see also Robert C. Ellickson, The False Promise of the Mixed-Income Housing
Project, 57 UCLA L. REV. 983, 989–90 (2010); Michael H. Schill, Privatizing Federal Low Income Housing
Assistance: The Case of Public Housing, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 878, 894–99 (1990).
177 See Ellickson, supra note 176, at 989–95; Green, supra note 9, at 91–92.
178 For example, the section 8 voucher program was designed to allow low-income families to obtain
housing on the open market. United States Housing Act of 1937 § 8, 42 U.S.C. § 1437f. HOPE VI aimed at
inducing local housing authorities to replace failed public-housing projects with mixed-income developments,
see Departments of Veterans Affairs and Housing and Urban Development, and Independent Agencies
Appropriations Act, 1993, Pub. L. No. 102-389, tit. II, 106 Stat. 1571, 1579 (1992), and recent legislation
required local housing authorities to rent more public-housing units to households whose incomes were not
extremely low, see Quality Housing and Work Responsibility Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-276, § 513(a), 112
Stat. 2461, 2544–45 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1437n(a)(3)).
179 See MARK SOLOF, N. JERSEY TRANSP. PLANNING AUTH., INC., HISTORY OF METROPOLITAN PLANNING
ORGANIZATIONS 17 (1998), available at http://www.njtpa.org/Pub/Report/hist_mpo/documents/MPO
history1998.pdf (summarizing federal legislation that conditioned federal funding on regional planning).
180 Id. at 26.
181 The Partnership defines “sustainable communities” as “places that have a variety of housing and
transportation choices, with destinations close to home.” Sustainable Communities, PARTNERSHIP FOR
SUSTAINABLE COMMUNITIES, http://www.sustainablecommunities.gov/ (last visited Aug. 22, 2012).
182 See Partnership Grants, Assistance & Programs, PARTNERSHIP FOR SUSTAINABLE COMMUNITIES,
http://www.sustainablecommunities.gov/grants.html (last visited Aug. 22, 2012) (listing federal grants and
programs for sustainable communities offered by the Partnership as well as individually by HUD, the DOT,
and the EPA).
183 See DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., NOTICE OF FUNDING AVAILABILITY (NOFA) FOR HUD’S FISCAL
YEAR 2011: SUSTAINABLE COMMUNITIES REGIONAL PLANNING GRANT PROGRAM 1 (2011), available at http://
archives.hud.gov/funding/2011/scrpgprenofa.pdf.
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Another interesting example of conditional funding is in the Coastal Zone
Management Act of 1972 (CZMA).184 Unlike other environmental laws that
threaten noncompliant states with federal preemption, the CZMA is entirely
voluntary.185 The CZMA provides states with two sets of incentives to
encourage them to develop comprehensive coastal-management programs that
meet federal approval standards: (a) federal funding and (b) regulatory
authority over their coastal zones, including the authority to ensure that federal
projects are consistent with the states’ plans.186 The CZMA recognizes the
traditional role that local officials play in administering land-use regulations
and requires states to create a regulatory framework that assures “the full
participation of those local governments and agencies” in implementing the
Act.187 Moreover, the federal standards are broadly drawn, leaving states with
substantial discretion to tailor the particular coastal-protection measures they
adopt.188 Although weaknesses in the evaluation process have made it difficult
to assess the CZMA’s effectiveness,189 nearly every coastal state has adopted a
plan in compliance with federal standards.190
2. Conditional Preemption
In addition to the carrot of federal funding, federal land laws often include
the stick of conditional preemption.191 Conditional preemption requires the
184

Pub. L. No. 92-583, 86 Stat. 1280 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 1451–1466 (2006)).
See Buzbee, supra note 73, at 110 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1455(d)(1)).
186 Ryan, supra note 139, at 59–60; see also 136 CONG. REC. 26,030, 26,030–67 (1990) (statement of
Rep. Walter B. Jones); Buzbee, supra note 73, at 111 (noting that the CZMA provides regulatory and financial
“incentives to direct development in ways avoiding environmental harms, yet without requiring any federal
displacement of local choices”).
187 16 U.S.C. § 1455(d)(3)(B).
188 Id. See generally NAT’L OCEAN SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, CZMA SECTION 312 EVALUATION
SUMMARY REPORT—2006 (2007), available at http://coastalmanagement.noaa.gov/success/media/
312summaryreport2006.pdf (identifying challenges for state coastal-management programs and encouraging
information exchange).
189 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-1045, COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT: MEASURING
PROGRAM’S EFFECTIVENESS CONTINUES TO BE A CHALLENGE 7 (2008), available at http://www.gao.gov/
assets/290/280782.pdf.
190 See Ryan, supra note 139, at 59 (“Thirty-four of thirty-five eligible states have approved coastalmanagement plans, and Illinois, the remaining state, is presently composing a plan.”); see also OFFICE OF
OCEAN & COASTAL RES. MGMT., U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, UPDATE ON COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT ACT
PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT SYSTEM, at ii (2006), available at http://coastalmanagement.noaa.gov/
resources/docs/npmsupdate.pdf.
191 See Hills, supra note 145, at 184; Hills, supra note 24, at 867 (“[P]rograms for conditional preemption
resemble programs for project grants; rather than presenting every state with the same package of conditions
and benefits, Congress establishes a set of criteria that each state might be able to meet in a different manner
by individually applying to a Federal agency for approval of its implementation plan.”); Philip J. Weiser,
185

OSTROW GALLEYS3

1430

8/24/2012 1:34 PM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 61:1397

states to cooperate in implementing the federal program or be preempted by
the federal government.192 In New York v. United States, the Supreme Court
held that the Tenth Amendment prohibits Congress from imposing some
affirmative duties on nonfederal officials.193 At the same time, however, the
Court maintained that, so long as Congress is authorized under the Commerce
Clause to preempt state regulation entirely, it may require states to choose
between regulating in accordance with federal standards and having their
nonconforming regulations preempted by federal law.194
The consequences of refusing to implement the cooperative program,
however, vary depending on the form of conditional preemption Congress
uses. This section identifies two forms of conditional preemption that appear in
federal land law: the federal-regulation model and the market-alternative
model. The federal-regulation model of conditional preemption presents states
with the following choice: regulate in accordance with federal standards or the
federal government will regulate directly.195 In contrast, the market-alternative
model tells states: regulate in accordance with federal standards or do not
regulate at all. Congress does not threaten to replace local officials with federal
agents. Instead, Congress threatens to leave the field unregulated.196
The federal-regulation model appears in Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining
& Reclamation Ass’n.197 In Hodel, the Court upheld a provision of the Surface
Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977198 (SMCRA) that required mine
operators to restore certain land to its pre-mining condition.199 In essence, the

Towards a Constitutional Architecture for Cooperative Federalism, 79 N.C. L. REV. 663, 668 (2001) (noting
that, through conditional preemption, “Congress either allows states to regulate in compliance with federal
standards or preempts state law with federal regulation”).
192 Davis, supra note 118, at 405; Weiser, supra note 191, at 668. See generally New York v. United
States, 505 U.S. 144, 167–68 (1992) (providing examples of conditional preemption, including the CWA, the
Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, and the
Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act).
193 See New York, 505 U.S. at 174–75; see also supra note 142.
194 See id. at 173–74.
195 Davis, supra note 118, at 405.
196 See id. at 405–06 & n.12 (identifying proposals for eliminating conditional-preemption schemes that
do not provide an alternative federal regulatory scheme); see also Hills, supra note 24, at 926 (criticizing the
Court’s acceptance of PURPA, which failed to provide a federal regulatory alternative for states that refused to
comply); Jared O’Connor, Note, National League of Cities Rising: How the Telecommunications Act of 1996
Could Expand Tenth Amendment Jurisprudence, 30 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 315, 346–47 (2003) (describing
the use of conditional preemption in the Telecommunications Act).
197 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
198 Pub. L. No. 95-87, 91 Stat. 445 (codified as amended at 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201–1328 (2006)).
199 See Hodel, 452 U.S. at 268.
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SMCRA told the states: regulate pursuant to our requirements or we will
regulate surface mining ourselves.200 Despite the tradition of localism in landuse law, the Court upheld this use of conditional preemption to invalidate
inconsistent state policies.201
In FERC v. Mississippi, decided one year after Hodel, the Court upheld the
market-alternative model.202 PURPA, which was at issue in FERC, required
states to consider federal standards for regulating utilities. In contrast to the
SMCRA, however, the federal government did not provide alternative federal
regulations for states that chose not to comply. The Court acknowledged the
dilemma created by this form of conditional preemption, stating:
We recognize, of course, that the choice put to the States—that of
either abandoning regulation of the field altogether or considering
the federal standards—may be a difficult one. And that is
particularly true when Congress, as is the case here, has failed to
provide an alternative regulatory mechanism to police the area in
the event of state default.203
Nevertheless, the Court determined that Congress may require states to choose
between regulating in accordance with federal standards or leaving the field
unregulated, subject only to the free market.204
a. The Federal-Regulation Model
A number of environmental laws utilize the federal-regulation model of
conditional preemption to persuade local officials to administer a federal
regulatory program. In general, environmental laws restrict or regulate the use
of land so as to protect natural resources or reduce pollution. Because the
purpose of these statutes is to restrict development, Congress first offers states
the opportunity to comply with federal restrictions and then provides
alternative federal regulations should states refuse to cooperate. Regardless of
which option a state chooses, the federal purpose is accomplished—

200 See id. at 270–72; see also Adler, Judicial Federalism, supra note 37, at 431 (describing the SMCRA
as offering states the alternative of federal regulation if they do not wish to regulate in accordance with the
federal scheme).
201 See FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 767 n.30 (1982) (noting that Hodel upheld SMCRA’s land-use
regulations although “regulation of land use is perhaps the quintessential state activity”).
202 Id. at 766.
203 Petersburg Cellular P’ship v. Bd. of Supervisors, 205 F.3d 688, 715 (4th Cir. 2000) (per curiam)
(quoting FERC, 456 U.S. at 766).
204 See FERC, 456 U.S. at 766.
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development will be restricted either by states complying with federal
requirements or by the federal regulatory alternative.
The Clean Air Act, for example, incentivizes state implementation of
federally imposed standards by threatening to replace state plans and local
discretion with federal plans.205 The Act affords state and local regulators
substantial discretion to allocate criteria pollutants, thus enabling local officials
to tailor patterns of development, building codes, public transportation,
farming practices, and wetland drainage to meet federal pollution-emission
standards.206 Yet, if a state fails to complete a plan that complies with all
requirements of the Act, the federal government may step in and implement a
federal plan.207 Under either scenario, air pollution will be regulated.
The CWA’s Stormwater Phase II Rule, which regulates the storm-water
discharges of small municipalities, provides another example of this form of
conditional preemption.208 Under the Phase II Rule, municipalities must
develop individually tailored storm-water-management programs that meet six
minimum federal criteria or submit to a more complex federal permitting
process.209 The Ninth Circuit sustained the Phase II Rule against a Tenth
Amendment challenge because the Phase II Rule gave municipal operators a
choice: implement the regulatory program required by the Phase II Rule or
become subject to a federal permitting scheme.210 Here, too, the national
objective is achieved—water pollution is regulated regardless of an individual
municipality’s choice.

205

See supra notes 48–51.
See Doremus & Hanemann, supra note 36, at 828.
207 Clean Air Act § 110(c), 42 U.S.C § 7410(c) (2006).
208 40 C.F.R. § 122.34 (2011). See generally John H. Minan, Municipal Separate Storm Sewer System
(MS4) Regulation Under the Federal Clean Water Act: The Role of Water Quality Standards?, 42 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. 1215 (2005) (providing an overview of the CWA’s municipal-storm-water regulations); Ryan, supra
note 139, at 56 (noting that the regulation of municipal storm water sits “vexingly at the crossroad between
land uses regulated locally and water pollution regulated federally”).
209 40 C.F.R. § 122.34. Specifically, the municipal program must contain the following elements: (1)
public education and outreach on storm-water impacts, (2) public involvement/participation, (3) illicitdischarge detection and elimination, (4) construction site storm-water-runoff control, (5) post-construction
storm-water management in new development and redevelopment, and (6) pollution prevention/good
housekeeping for municipal operations. Id.
210 See Envtl. Def. Ctr., Inc. v. EPA, 344 F.3d 832, 847 (9th Cir. 2003) (“With the Phase II Rule, EPA
gave the operators of small MS4s a choice: either implement the regulatory program spelled out by the
Minimum Measures described at 40 C.F.R. § 122.34(b), or pursue the Alternative Permit option and seek a
permit under the Phase I Rule as described at 40 C.F.R. § 122.26(d).”).
206
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b. The Market-Alternative Model
In contrast, under the market-alternative model of conditional preemption,
local officials must regulate in accordance with federal standards or leave the
substantive area unregulated and subject only to the free market. In essence,
Congress permits states to regulate the protected land use so long as states
comply with the federal standards. If states refuse to comply, Congress is
content to leave the area unregulated, assuming that the free market will
produce at least as much, and likely more, of the desired land use.
Several federal siting regimes utilize the market-alternative model. Federal
siting regimes are designed to promote land use, albeit a particular type of land
use. For example, the Telecommunications Siting Policy is expressly designed
to streamline the local land-use-permitting process so as to facilitate the rapid
deployment of a national telecommunications network.211 To that end, the
Telecommunications Siting Policy establishes threshold federal requirements
for cell-phone-tower siting.212 State and local land-use regulators must comply
with these federal requirements or refrain from regulating the siting of cell
phone towers entirely.213 As the Fourth Circuit explained in considering a
Tenth Amendment challenge to the Telecommunications Siting Policy,
“Because Congress could validly prohibit states from regulating the siting of
telecommunications towers, it may constitutionally offer states a choice
between (1) being subject to such a prohibition or (2) processing permit
applications for communications towers in accordance with [federal
standards].”214
RLUIPA presents localities with a similar option in regulating religious
land uses. RLUIPA is intended to protect religious land use in the zoning
process.215 RLUIPA, thus, prohibits local governments from “implement[ing] a
land use regulation in a manner that imposes a substantial burden on the
religious exercise of a person . . . unless the government demonstrates that [the
regulation] . . . (A) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and
(B) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental

211

See supra Part I.C.2.b.
See Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 704(a), 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(i)–(iii).
213 See id. § 332(c)(7)(B)(v) (giving the right to sue to persons adversely affected by an action of a state
government that is inconsistent with the statute’s limitations).
214 Petersburg Cellular P’ship v. Bd. of Supervisors, 205 F.3d 688, 715 (4th Cir. 2000) (per curiam).
215 See Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 § 2, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc.
212
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interest.”216 Zoning boards must comply with the federal requirements or leave
religious land use unregulated.
* * *
Of course, the choice presented to local governments—regulate in
accordance with federal standards or abandon zoning—is largely illusory. No
local government would choose to entirely relinquish its land-use regulatory
authority, even over a limited category of land uses, such as cell phone towers,
group homes for the disabled, or churches. Indeed, Judge Niemeyer, the only
judge to have determined that the Telecommunications Siting Policy
“commandeer[ed]” local officials in violation of the Tenth Amendment,
emphasized the coerciveness of this “choice” in light of the importance of
land-use regulation to local governments.217 According to Judge Niemeyer:
To suggest that a local governmental body withdraw from landuse regulation and leave the construction of structures in the
community to the whims of the market is nothing short of
suggesting that it end its existence in one of its most vital aspects.
. . . If a state, county, or town abandoned its local land-use
power to regulate the siting of communications facilities, any
number of telecommunications towers and other communications
facilities could be erected in the midst of residential
neighborhoods, next to schools, or in bucolic natural settings such
as in the woods or on top of mountains—areas held in high value
by most communities. Abandoning land use power in this way
would put at risk the property value of every home in the
jurisdiction and create the possibility that aesthetic quality of
every area in the jurisdiction would be destroyed.218
In contrast to Judge Niemeyer, most courts have concluded that requiring landuse authorities to regulate in accordance with federal standards does not
commandeer state officials.219 Moreover, this Article maintains that, in some
216

Id. § 2000cc(a)(1).
Petersburg Cellular P’ship, 205 F.3d at 699–705 (quoting New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144,
175 (1992)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Judge Niemeyer concluded that the Telecommunications
Siting Policy violates the Tenth Amendment because “[t]he abandonment of land use control for towers is not
a viable option for state and local governments.” Id. at 703; accord Clive B. Jacques & Jack M. Beermann,
Section 1983’s “and Laws” Clause Run Amok: Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees in Cellular Facilities Siting
Disputes, 81 B.U. L. REV. 735, 779 (2001) (arguing that the Telecommunications Act’s cellular-tower-siting
provisions commandeer state agents in violation of the Tenth Amendment).
218 Petersburg Cellular P’ship, 205 F.3d at 703.
219 See, e.g., Cellular Phone Taskforce v. FCC, 205 F.3d 82 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding that 47 U.S.C.
§ 332(c)(7)(B)(iv) complies with the Tenth Amendment both facially and as applied); New Cingular Wireless
217
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instances, local governments should be “coerced” into considering the broader
implications of their local land-use decisions.220 To that end, the next Part
introduces a local-official-as-federal-agent model that permits the federal
government to establish standards that promote the national welfare without
sacrificing the many benefits of decentralized governance.221
III. LOCAL OFFICIALS AS FEDERAL AGENTS
Having established a normative and doctrinal justification for the use of
federal law to address cumulative land-use problems in Part I and investigated
the mechanics of federal land law in Part II, this Part considers the most basic
question of federalism; namely, how should land-use regulatory authority be
allocated between the national government and its subnational units?222
To answer this question, this Part assesses the comparative regulatory
capacity at each level of government—federal, state, and local—to address

PCS, LLC v. City of Cambridge, No. 10-11541-NMG, 2011 WL 6755835 (D. Mass. Dec. 22, 2011) (holding
that the substantial-evidence requirement passes muster under the Tenth Amendment); United States v. Maui
County, 298 F. Supp. 2d 1010, 1015–16 (D. Haw. 2003) (finding similarity between RLUIPA and the TCA in
that both are valid despite the fact that they intrude on some local land-use decisions); USOC of Greater Iowa,
Inc. v. City of Bellevue, 279 F. Supp. 2d 1080, 1087 (D. Neb. 2003) (rejecting a Tenth Amendment challenge
to the “in writing” and “substantial evidence” requirements of the TCA); SBA Commc’ns, Inc. v. Zoning
Comm’n, 164 F. Supp. 2d 280, 289 (D. Conn. 2001) (holding that the substantial-evidence standard does not
violate the Tenth Amendment); Am. Tower, L.P. v. City of Huntsville, No. CV-99-B-2933-NE, 2000 WL
34017802, at *34 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 29, 2000) (holding that the TCA does not violate the Tenth Amendment).
The fact that the Telecommunications Siting Policy blends substantive and procedural constraints does not
impact this analysis. As the Supreme Court held in FERC, “If Congress can require a state administrative body
to consider proposed regulations as a condition to its continued involvement in a pre-emptible field—and we
hold today that it can—there is nothing unconstitutional about Congress’ requiring certain procedural minima
as that body goes about undertaking its tasks.” FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 771 (1982).
220 Accord Robert L. Glicksman & Richard E. Levy, A Collective Action Perspective on Ceiling
Preemption by Federal Environmental Regulation: The Case of Global Climate Change, 102 NW. U. L. REV.
579, 608 (2008) (arguing that ceiling preemption is a proper response to NIMBYism); Thomas W. Merrill,
Preemption in Environmental Law: Formalism, Federalism Theory, and Default Rules, in FEDERAL
PREEMPTION: STATES’ POWERS, NATIONAL INTERESTS 166, 176 (Richard A. Epstein & Michael S. Greve eds.,
2007) (“NIMBY laws present a classic example of the prisoners’ dilemma: everyone has an incentive to export
the costs of an activity [such as a locally undesirable land use], but if everyone pursues this strategy, the
benefits associated with the activity are lost to all.”); Ostrow, supra note 2, at 324 (noting that, absent a federal
policy compelling local decision makers to consider the broader implications of their decisions, they are often
unwilling to do so).
221 See Ostrow, supra note 2, at 324–25.
222 See supra note 25.
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cumulative land-use problems.223 Local zoning is far too narrow in scope, and
local governments lack the legal authority and political and economic
incentives to consider the cumulative impact of local decisions and respond
accordingly. At the same time, centralized federal agencies lack the detailed
knowledge necessary to make context-specific land-use decisions.224 The very
distance that enables the national government to establish general policies in
furtherance of national goals prevents the federal government from efficiently
and effectively implementing these polices at the local level, where the costs
are concentrated.225
This Part argues that a local-official-as-federal-agent model of land use law
is likely to generate land-use decisions that are consistent with national policy
goals but sensitive to the local context. Section A describes the passive role
that states have traditionally played in land-use law. Section B illustrates the
relative institutional capacity of the federal government to respond to
cumulative, multijurisdictional land-use problems. Section C emphasizes the
importance of preserving a primary role for local officials in implementing
land-use law. Local officials who are part of the community and politically
accountable to it are in the best position to make the types of detailed, contextspecific decisions that arise in regulating the use of land.226
Though localities are, at least initially, created by the state, they are
ultimately more than mere agents of the state.227 Particularly in the context of

223 “Regulatory capacity is the power to make things happen—by whatever resources or institutional
feature enables either side to accomplish an objective that the other cannot do as well.” Ryan, supra note 139,
at 90.
224 See Hills, supra note 143, at 1206 (“Congress is simply not as well-suited as the states for creating
institutions that deliver local public goods to the residents of a state in a politically accountable and costeffective way.”); Selmi, supra note 4, at 616 (“Largely by highlighting its responsiveness to local conditions,
local government has retained almost full authority over land use . . . .”).
225 See supra note 161.
226 See Dwyer, supra note 19, at 1218 (“Precisely because they are local, and locally accountable, state
and local officials bring that knowledge and orientation to implementation and enforcement.”); Freyfogle,
supra note 5, at 580 (“Sensible land use decisions require knowledge of the land itself, in its many
variations. . . . Local people typically know the land better than outsiders.”); Keith H. Hirokawa, Property
Pieces in Compensation Statutes: Law’s Eulogy for Oregon’s Measure 37, 38 ENVTL. L. 1111, 1142 (2008)
(arguing that zoning enables local governments to address issues of local concern and to “create intentional
and organized communities”); Ostrow, supra note 2, at 296 (“[L]ocal primacy in this area of law stems from a
practical recognition that local governments are institutionally better suited to this task than are higher levels
of government.”).
227 See Briffault, supra note 4, at 91 (describing local governments as agents of the state and of the local
community); Davidson, supra note 26, at 979–80 (describing competing accounts of local governments as
agents of the state and as democratically accountable popular governments).
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land use, local governments represent local communities. The Supreme Court
set the tone in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. when it emphasized the
municipality’s autonomous political identity separate from the state and from
the larger region.228 When local officials implement federal land-use policies,
they act as double agents, serving both the federal government and local
community.229 As federal agents, local officials further national policy goals,
but as agents of the community, local officials actively tailor broad national
land-use policies to accommodate local geographic and economic conditions
and community preferences.
A. The Silent States
Although zoning has traditionally been considered a local endeavor, the
legal authority to regulate land derives, in the first instance, from the states’
police power. The states, then, are certainly the most obvious choice for
engaging in centralized land-use planning. Yet, there are two reasons to be
wary of relying primarily on the states to account for cumulative land-use
problems. First, states have always retained broad discretion to modify or
reduce local land-use authority but have generally refused to do so.230 In the
1920s, most state legislatures expressly delegated their land-use regulatory
authority to localities through the adoption of zoning enabling acts.231 In 1971,
Fred Bosselman and David Callies declared the start of a “quiet revolution,”232
in which state governments would reclaim their land-use regulatory authority
from localities so as to address extralocal problems that exceeded the capacity
of individual local governments.233 More than forty years later, the anticipated
revolution has yet to materialize, and there is little reason to think that the

228

272 U.S. 365, 389 (1926).
See Gerken, supra note 25, at 39–40 (analogizing sub-local officials, such as zoning board members,
with servants and arguing that the power of the servant derives in part from serving two masters).
230 See Bronin, supra note 4, at 268 (“With the power to pass laws, which affect each locality, states have
the power to reform the land use regulation system in a significant way to effect change on the wide scale,
which the evidence suggests is necessary. Yet no state has demonstrated a willingness to change local land use
laws to respond to the mounting evidence against conventional construction.”).
231 Griffith, supra note 6, at 523; Ostrow, supra note 2, at 728.
232 BOSSELMAN & CALLIES, supra note 29, at 1.
233 See id. at 3 (“[S]tates . . . are the only existing political entities capable of devising innovative
techniques and governmental structures to solve problems . . . beyond the capacity of local governments acting
alone.”).
229
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states are poised to supplant local governments as the primary land-use
regulators.234
Second, over the next few decades, the vast amount of growth in the United
States is predicted to be concentrated within ten megaregions, many of which
cross state boundaries.235 Thus, as the next section explains, it is not clear that
individual states will have the regulatory capacity to effectively coordinate
land use, even if they were inclined to do so.
B. A National Perspective
Where the cumulative impact of local land-use policies generates
substantial extralocal social and economic costs, only the federal government
has the legal authority and the financial resources to respond at the appropriate
scale.236 The federal government’s capacity to compel states to internalize the
costs of their activities has historically been a key justification for federal
environmental law.237 Indeed, as the challenge of siting nationwide
infrastructure demonstrates, it is difficult to address interstate and interlocal
spillovers within a decentralized regulatory system.238 In the words of Steven
G. Calabresi, “Sometimes variety is not the spice of life; as to some items it
may be a downright nuisance and an expensive one at that. National
234 See Bronin, supra note 4, at 232; David L. Callies, The Quiet Revolution Redux: How Selected Local
Governments Have Fared, 20 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 277, 296–97 (2002) (“Local land use controls have not
withered away . . . . [N]ot only have traditional land use controls such as zoning and more flexible ‘growth
management’ plans and regulations been used, but there is a growing trend toward environmental protection at
the local level as well.” (footnotes omitted)); Fischel, supra note 4, § 3, at 5 (“[W]ithin a few years even its
enthusiasts had conceded that the revolution had gotten so quiet as to be inaudible.” (citation omitted));
Amnon Lehavi, Intergovernmental Liability Rules, 92 VA. L. REV. 929, 935–37 (2006) (describing changes in
zoning and concluding that “states still leave the overwhelming majority of land use regulation to generalpurpose local governments”); Saxer, supra note 75, at 678 (“Th[e] shift in responsibility from local to state
control has not yet occurred as predicted, though some scholars continue to see a trend in growth management
programs toward greater state intervention in the local planning and implementation process.”).
235 See ROBERT E. LANG & DAWN DHAVALE, CENSUS REPORT NO. 05:01, BEYOND MEGALOPOLIS:
EXPLORING AMERICA’S NEW “MEGAPOLITAN” GEOGRAPHY 12–13 (2005), available at http://america2050.org/
pdf/beyondmegalopolislang.pdf (identifying ten “megapolitan” areas).
236 See Ostrow, supra note 2, at 305–06.
237 See id.; Kirsten H. Engel, State Environmental Standard-Setting: Is There a “Race” and Is It “to the
Bottom”?, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 271 (1997) (presenting the classic “race-to-the-bottom” justification for federal
environmental law).
238 See Christina C. Caplan, The Failure of Current Legal and Regulatory Mechanisms to Control
Interstate Ozone Transport: The Need for New National Legislation, 28 ECOLOGY L.Q. 169, 201–02 (2001)
(arguing that interstate spillovers cannot be remedied within a decentralized system); Esty, supra note 19, at
624 (“[W]hen problems are transboundary in scope . . . decentralized enforcement breaks down entirely.”);
Ostrow, supra note 2, at 305–06.
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government eliminates these potential deadweight social costs with general
gains in social utility as a result.”239
The relative institutional capacity of the federal government to account for
interstate spillovers will likely increase as the scale of metropolitan governance
expands to encompass “megapolitan” regions.240 Professor Nestor Davidson
has argued that the growth of these interstate megaregions may trigger an
increased federal role in urban governance as these new regions turn toward
the federal government to address complex multijurisdictional regulatory
problems, such as climate change, urban sprawl, and the bursting of the
subprime-mortgage bubble.241
In addition, in the siting context, variations in local permitting processes
inhibit the growth of nationwide infrastructure. Increased regulatory uniformity
encourages the development of capital-intensive infrastructure by reducing
compliance costs and creating a more predictable regulatory environment.242
For regional or national developers, centralized review of permitting
applications is often preferable to local jurisdiction. As one energy consultant
explained, “State permitting is advantageous to power plant developers
because state proceedings are removed from local electoral politics. State
permit reviews are never simple and are always costly. . . . Still, a state
proceeding offers a degree of time certainty and an atmosphere of fairness
often absent at the local level.”243
Moreover, the federal government, which is physically and metaphorically
removed from local politics and economic constraints, has a far greater
239 Steven G. Calabresi, “A Government of Limited and Enumerated Powers”: In Defense of United
States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV. 752, 780 (1995).
240 See LANG & DHAVALE, supra note 235, at 12–13; see also, e.g., ROBERT E. LANG ET AL., METRO.
POLICY PROGRAM AT BROOKINGS, MOUNTAIN MEGAS: AMERICAS’S NEWEST METROPOLITAN PLACES AND A
FEDERAL PARTNERSHIP TO HELP THEM PROSPER 11, 15 (2008), available at http://www.brookings.edu/
~/media/research/files/reports/2008/7/20%20mountainmegas%20sarzynski/imw_full_report.pdf
(discussing
emerging megapolitan regions in the Intermountain West).
241 See Nestor M. Davidson, Leaps and Bounds, 108 MICH. L. REV. 957, 969 n.46 (2010) (reviewing
GERALD E. FRUG & DAVID J. BARRON, CITY BOUND: HOW STATES STIFLE URBAN INNOVATION (2008)); see
also Klass & Wilson, supra note 6 (manuscript at 22) (identifying regulatory mismatch between interstate
transmission siting subject to intrastate regulation); Ruhl & Salzman, supra note 62, at 64–65 (identifying
climate change, urban sprawl, and the bursting of the subprime-mortgage bubble as “massive problems with
dimensions far beyond the capacity of any single agency to manage effectively”).
242 See Esty, supra note 19, at 619; Ostrow, supra note 2, at 307; see also Sovacool, supra note 38, at
421–22.
243 Robert D. Kahn, Siting Struggles: The Unique Challenge of Permitting Renewable Energy Power
Plants, ELECTRICITY J., Mar. 2000, at 21, 24.
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capacity to enact policies that have substantial redistributive effects. Paul
Peterson argues that the lessening of restrictions on the flow of capital and
credit at the national level allows for redistributive policies that are not
politically viable at the local level.244 Sheryll Cashin similarly argues that “the
national legislature possesses several institutional advantages over state
legislatures, including a captured tax base and its facility for logrolling
arrangements that tend to equalize power between representatives of affluent
and poor districts.”245
In contrast, for economic and political reasons, local officials rarely compel
their constituents to accept unpopular land-use decisions.246 Local services—
schools, police, fire protection, and sanitation, among others—are financed
through local taxes, primarily the property tax.247 As a result, state and local
officials are exquisitely sensitive to local property values, aiming to attract
land uses (and users) that contribute more to the local tax base than they
consume in services.248 As Richard Briffault observes, “Contemporary cities,
as a rule, do not engage in innovative redistributive programs, not because they
lack the legal authority, but rather because they fear that initiating such
programs would cause residential and commercial taxpayers to depart.”249
C. Local Tailoring
Given the enormous variability of land, it would be difficult, if not
impossible, for the federal government to enact uniform, substantive land-use

244

PAUL E. PETERSON, CITY LIMITS 183 (1981).
Sheryll D. Cashin, Federalism, Welfare Reform, and the Minority Poor: Accounting for the Tyranny of
State Majorities, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 552, 594 (1999).
246 See PETERSON, supra note 244, at 69–70 (stating that central governments are more likely to enact
redistributive policies than are local governments). See generally MARK SCHNEIDER, THE COMPETITIVE CITY:
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF SUBURBIA (1989) (exploring political and economic incentives of suburban
governments, focusing on the effect of competition among local governments).
247 See Richard Briffault, The Local Government Boundary Problem in Metropolitan Areas, 48 STAN. L.
REV. 1115, 1115, 1129 (1996) (“Local boundaries are central to the raising and spending of local
revenue. . . . The principal source of locally-raised revenue for municipalities is the property tax.”); Lehavi,
supra note 234, at 948 & n.84 (explaining that local governments finance their expenditures mainly through
revenue that is generated by taxes); Serkin, supra note 85, at 1646–47 (arguing that local governments are
responsive to homeowners who “pay for local government services through property taxes and receive the
benefit of those services in increased property values”).
248 See Briffault, supra note 77, at 408; Hills, supra note 143, at 1217–18.
249 Briffault, supra note 77, at 408; see also Cashin, supra note 245, at 594–95 (observing that the
national government has historically “been far more interventionist than have state governments on behalf of
both the poor and racial minorities”).
245
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policies.250 The United States spans a continent and is home to deserts,
mountains, plains, and coastal regions.251 In some areas, land has been
intensively developed; in others, land has been preserved in its natural state.252
Even adjacent parcels of land “can vary dramatically in their topography and
soil characteristics, their hydrology and ecology.”253 As Justice Story explained
in requiring specific performance of land contracts:
The locality, character, vicinage, peculiar soil, or accommodations
of the land generally, may give it a peculiar and special value in
the eyes of the purchaser; and it cannot be replaced by other land
of the same precise value, or having the same precise local
conveniences or accommodations; and therefore a compensation
in damages would not be adequate relief.254
Generally, a landowner will have deliberately accumulated the parcel in its
present form—“it can be cropped in line with the family’s resources, it can be
divided for inheritance, or it makes aesthetic or economic sense.”255 Through
its use, land obtains a subjective value that cannot be measured solely in
monetary terms.256
Thus, the substantive content of “good” land-use law can only be
determined in the context of its location.257 Many land-use questions cannot be
250 See Jonathan H. Adler, Jurisdictional Mismatch in Environmental Federalism, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J.
130, 136 (2005) (“The failure to take into account local environmental conditions—let alone local tastes,
preferences, and economic conditions—leads to ‘one size fits all’ policies that fit few areas well, if at all.”);
Karol Ceplo & Bruce Yandle, Western States and Environmental Federalism: An Examination of Institutional
Viability, in ENVIRONMENTAL FEDERALISM 225, 225–26 (Terry L. Anderson & Peter J. Hill eds., 1997)
(“There is recognition that homogeneous solutions applied to heterogeneous problems often yield high costs
and weak results.”); Karkkainen, supra note 19, at 80 (noting concerns regarding “rigidities and inefficiencies
of sweeping, uniform federal controls on land use”); Trisolini, supra note 4, at 740 (“The variation of urban
form renders land use inevitably local to a large degree.”).
251 See Dwyer, supra note 19, at 1218; Peñalver, supra note 3, at 828.
252 Fischel, supra note 4, § 8, at 15 (noting the use of satellite imagery to provide evidence regarding the
ratio of urbanized land to agricultural land).
253 Peñalver, supra note 3, at 828.
254 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, AS ADMINISTERED IN ENGLAND AND
AMERICA § 746, at 51 (Boston, Hilliard, Gray, & Co. 1836) (footnote omitted). As sociologists John Logan
and Harvey Molotch put it, “Every parcel of land is unique in the idiosyncratic access it provides to other
parcels and uses, and this quality underscores the specialness of property as a commodity.” LOGAN &
MOLOTCH, supra note 3, at 23.
255 Jeffry A. Frieden, Towards a Political Economy of Takings, 3 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 137, 141 (2000).
256 See Serkin, supra note 85, at 1655–56 (arguing that an account of land that focuses purely on market
value misses the subjective value that owners place on the use of the land); see also Joseph William Singer,
The Reliance Interest in Property, 40 STAN. L. REV. 611, 663–99 (1988).
257 See RUTHERFORD H. PLATT, LAND USE AND SOCIETY: GEOGRAPHY, LAW, AND PUBLIC POLICY 419
(rev. ed. 2004) (noting that the substance of “good” land-use practices is “informed by the geographical
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answered in the abstract.258 Whether a parcel of land should be developed for
residential use or preserved for open space, or whether a church should be sited
in a commercial district depends upon the desired city form and socioeconomic
makeup of the area. To borrow from Justice Sutherland’s analysis in Euclid:
[T]he question whether the power exists to forbid the erection of a
building of a particular kind or for a particular use . . . is to be
determined, not by an abstract consideration of the building or of
the thing considered apart, but by considering it in connection
with the circumstances and the locality.259
In contrast to federal bureaucrats, local officials are literally on the
ground.260 Local officials, who are a part of the local community and are
politically accountable to it, have the nuanced knowledge and local
sensibilities necessary to regulate land.261 Indeed, John Dwyer similarly
concluded in the context of the Clean Air Act:
The practical need to tailor implementation and enforcement to
local conditions requires decision-makers who have, in addition to
an adequate knowledge of these conditions, a sympathetic
orientation toward local conditions. . . . Precisely because they are
local, and locally accountable, state and local officials bring that
knowledge and orientation to implementation and enforcement.262
Moreover, local implementation preserves traditional federalism values—
avoiding the undue concentration of regulatory authority in one level of
government; fostering democratic accountability and responsiveness; and
leaving ample room for local variation, innovation, and competition.263 Local
context of the physical and socioeconomic systems in which land use operates” (emphasis omitted)); Frieden,
supra note 255, at 141 (“Although some land is undifferentiated and standardized, the value of most land is
highly specific to its location, owner, and its current use.”); Hirokawa, supra note 226, at 1142 (“[T]he
propriety of particular land uses is governed by their locational context . . . .”).
258 See Daniel R. Mandelker & A. Dan Tarlock, Shifting the Presumption of Constitutionality in Land-Use
Law, 24 URB. LAW. 1, 9–10 (1992) (noting the difficulty of identifying transcendent zoning values that apply
to all land-use decisions).
259 Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926).
260 See S. Candice Hoke, Preemption Pathologies and Civic Republican Values, 71 B.U. L. REV. 685, 695
(1991); see also supra note 161.
261 See supra notes 227–29 and accompanying text
262 Dwyer, supra note 19, at 1218.
263 In the familiar words of the Court, federalism
assures a decentralized government that will be more sensitive to the diverse needs of a
heterogeneous society; it increases opportunity for citizen involvement in democratic processes;
it allows for more innovation and experimentation in government; and it makes government more
responsive by putting the States in competition for a mobile citizenry.
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zoning boards are easily accessible and exquisitely responsive to the
preferences of local residents.264 Local units, especially those charged with
land-use control, exhibit the traits most closely identified with political
participation: they are small, yet powerful.265 Local zoning proceedings often
feature high rates of local participation and provide a robust forum for
participatory democracy,266 allowing democratic communities to develop their
character and pursue common goals.267
Citizen participation in policy making, in turn, promotes local tailoring and
experimentation. Local implementation enables local regulators to experiment
with novel implementation techniques with the expectation that optimal
regulatory strategies will vary by locale.268 Local governments learn from each
other and from the national government. The national government is able to
build upon the best practices of its constituent units but avoid locking in a
suboptimal regulatory standard.269 In this way, the local-official-as-federal-

Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991); accord Gerken, supra note 25, at 6 (“[F]ederalism promotes
choice, competition, participation, experimentation, and the diffusion of power.”); David S. Rubenstein,
Delegating Supremacy?, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1125, 1161–63 (2012) (considering values of federalism in
administrative agencies); Ryan, supra note 27, at 601 (identifying values underlying a federal system of
government); Ryan, supra note 139, at 10 (listing traditional federalism values).
264 See Serkin, supra note 85, at 1649–50 (noting that “actual participation in local decisionmaking is
relatively easy” and that property owners have both the incentive and political power to influence zoning
decisions).
265 See Briffault, supra note 247, at 1123–24 (“[S]maller political units enhance the benefits of
participation by increasing the likelihood that a citizen’s ‘action will make a significant difference in the
outcome . . . .” (quoting ROBERT A. DAHL & EDWARD R. TUFTE, SIZE AND DEMOCRACY 41 (1973))); Gerald E.
Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1069–70 (1980) (noting first that “limited size
appears to be a prerequisite to individual participation in political life” and second that “[n]o one is likely to
participate in the decisionmaking of an entity of any size unless that participation will make a difference in his
life”).
266 Gerken, supra note 25, at 22.
267 See Ostrow, supra note 2, at 297; see also Hirokawa, supra note 73, at 773 (“Through zoning and
planning, local governments have engaged in a self-identification process and implemented community visions
in the process of designing communities.”).
268 See Philip J. Weiser, Federal Common Law, Cooperative Federalism, and the Enforcement of the
Telecom Act, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1692, 1702 (2001); cf. Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability:
Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in the Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461, 545 (2003) (describing, as a
possible objection to agency rulemaking, that “[i]t requires agencies to set achievable levels of compliance
based on speculation when they more fruitfully might experiment with proposed levels”); William W. Buzbee,
Interaction’s Promise: Preemption Policy Shifts, Risk Regulation, and Experimentalism Lessons, 57 EMORY
L.J. 145, 157 & n.42 (2007) (using experimentalist scholarship to analyze the risk of aggressive preemption).
269 Schapiro, supra note 25, at 293; see also Buzbee, supra note 19, at 108 (noting that there are benefits
of regulatory overlap and cooperative-federalism structures); Engel, supra note 19, at 187 (arguing that the
static allocation of regulatory authority to either the state or federal government obstructs good environmental
management and that broadly overlapping state and federal regulatory jurisdiction is needed).
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agent model effectively balances national land-use priorities and local land-use
concerns.
CONCLUSION
Though land is local, land use is not. In the aggregate, local land use
generates harms that far exceed the remedial capacity of local governments.
While other formerly local areas have since been subsumed by the states or the
federal government, land-use law has retained much of its local character.
Nonetheless, modern land-use law involves a significant, though
undertheorized, national dimension. In the absence of a national land-use
policy, scholars have studied individual federal laws that impact the
development of privately owned land in isolation, describing an uncoordinated
federal statutory patchwork.
This Article brings order to the federal patchwork, developing a coherent
national account of land-use law. This account supplements the traditional
localist account by (a) demonstrating that federal law can (and sometimes
should) be used to account for the cumulative effects of local land-use
decisions on interstate commerce, (b) constructing a theoretical framework
through which to analyze the existing body of federal land law, and (c) using
insights of federalism theory to identify the benefits of a local-official-asfederal-agent model of land-use law. In allocating authority to both national
and local regulators, this model quite consciously accounts for the unique
duality of land.

